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Some say the world will end in fire, Some say in ice . . . .And 
[either] would suffice. 
—Robert Frost1 
ABSTRACT 
 Fire and ice will forge the future of the world.  The constitutional 
battle in the United States vis-à-vis global warming will determine the 
future of fire and ice.  The electric sector of the economy holds the key; 
a fundamental transition to renewable energy is necessary to create a 
sustainable economy and abate global warming.  As of 2009, ten U.S. 
states are vigorously moving toward implementing a feed-in tariff 
regulatory mechanism similar to those adopted previously by eighteen 
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of the European Kyoto Protocol countries to shift to renewable power 
technologies.  However, these feed-in tariffs could be found to violate 
the U.S. Constitution and plunge policy over an immovable legal cliff.  
This article outlines how twenty-seven U.S. states and five European 
Kyoto Protocol countries employ the constitutionally defensible 
alternative policy of renewable portfolio standards. 
Effectively reducing mounting annual carbon emissions is a 
profound global challenge.  This article compares and contrasts the 
legality of the two primary means that states use to promote alternative 
renewable energy technologies so as to minimize carbon emissions: 
feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards.  These methods are 
analyzed against the Supremacy Clause requirements of the 
Constitution to determine which could violate existing U.S. law, 
dooming renewable energy and carbon control efforts.  This analysis 
examines the policy options, their implementation, and what will and 
will not pass legal challenges. 
For a global push against global warming, the ends must not 
legally be confused with the means.  The common goals of reducing the 
concentration of greenhouse gases cannot be implemented with the 
same tools under the separate legal systems of the United States and 
Europe. Getting legal policy right is imperative so that the transition to 
sustainable development proceeds smoothly and expeditiously and is 
not stalled in a protracted constitutional challenge. 
I. FIRE AND ICE: WHEN RENEWABLES GO LEGALLY RIGHT AND 
WRONG 
We are on the verge of world calamity by fire and ice.  The “fire” 
is climate warming, cranking up the global thermostat to the tipping 
point of catastrophe.  The “ice” is the melting of the polar ice caps—
which contain more than ninety percent of the world’s fresh water—
in this global flame.  Once melted, that fresh water is lost in the ocean 
brine.  As set forth below, the solution must be rapid deployment of 
renewable resources in lieu of carbon-rich fuels. 
However, there is a schism between the needed expedited 
transition to renewable resources and the requirements of the U.S. 
Constitution.  The attempt by U.S. states to copy the European model 
of feed-in tariffs to promote renewable power is running afoul of U.S. 
constitutional requirements.  The ten states now launching feed-in 
tariffs will face the stern hand of the Constitution, which could set 
back their efforts. The legal gauntlet has already been thrown: In the 
past year, the first legal challenge to both state Renewable Portfolio 
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Standards (RPSs) and to state regulation of carbon emissions from 
power plants has been filed. 
This article examines U.S. efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, the requirements of law, and the looming legal 
confrontation between state efforts and the Constitution.  Because 
carbon control is important and urgent, this article suggests 
alternatives to feed-in tariffs, including RPSs, that escape these legal 
traps.  It examines those legal impediments and charts routes around 
them to promote renewable power in the United States.  It traces 
legal alternatives to promote rapid deployment of renewable 
resources in the United States, which may help prevent the world 
from ending in fire or ice. 
A. The Constitutional Backstop 
For the past two centuries, the Constitution has limited both 
good ideas and bad.  Even in the interests of abating global warming 
and promoting renewable energy, the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution remains a legal backstop that may become a barrier.  In 
a federalist system, what the states may do is limited by the 
Constitution.  European nations’ penchant for having utilities pay 
more for renewable power through feed-in tariffs would run afoul of 
precedent interpreting energy and environmental regulations 
permissible under the Constitution.  How the United States and 
Europe can attack global warming marks a major legal divide. 
Nonetheless, ten states in the United States are now considering 
the adoption of European-style feed-in tariffs to force electric utilities 
to pay more for renewable power than for conventional power.  This 
is likely to invoke a confrontation over the Supremacy Clause that 
will imperil such renewable power initiatives.  These constitutional 
limitations cannot be overcome by passing a state statute.  The 
Constitution remains the ultimate law of the land, and its Supremacy 
Clause embodies an essential element of the United States’ legal 
construct.  A European-style feed-in tariff could be implemented in 
the United States only via amendments to the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) and the Federal Power Act (FPA).  
In the past year, both state RPSs and state regulation of carbon 
emissions from power plants have been challenged in court. 
This article is the first to examine the legal problems with U.S. 
states’ attempts to graft the European system of renewable energy 
subsidies onto the U.S. system.  Section I.B, immediately below, sets 
forth the fundamental relationship between the conventional 
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production of electricity and the global threat of GHG-fostered 
global warming.  Section II sets forth the ability of abundant 
renewable energy resources to abate global warming. 
Section III explores regulatory mechanisms for promotion of 
renewable resources in the United States, including federal tax 
credits, state system benefit charges, and federal PURPA renewable 
energy purchase requirements.  Section IV goes further, analyzing 
newly burgeoning state RPSs—now employed in more than half the 
U.S. states and several European nations, including Sweden, Italy, 
and the U.K.—and their variations and potentials to promote 
renewable resources.  These RPS programs are the major renewable 
power incentives used in the U.S. and promise to be addressed in 
future federal legislation.  Section V analyzes the constitutional issues 
with RPSs, including the Commerce Clause limitations on states and 
ownership issues. 
Section VI introduces European feed-in tariffs, pending feed-in 
tariff programs in ten U.S. states, and the constitutional barriers to 
adoption of these programs.  Good policy does not always equate 
with passing legal muster.  Key federal court and federal agency 
decisions interpreting these issues are analyzed.  Finally, the “bright 
line” rearticulated in a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision is 
examined. 
Good ideas—even for renewable power and the abatement of 
global warming—must be consistent with federal law and the 
Constitution. Sometimes even good ideas regarding global warming 
policy are not permissible in the U.S. legal system.  The legal systems 
of European nations and the United States are distinct.  What is 
acceptable in one does not always seamlessly translate legally to the 
other.  Fortunately, the array of other incentives available in the U.S. 
system, particularly the RPS system now adopted in half the states, 
remains a legally viable alternative for renewable energy and 
reduction of GHGs.  This article examines all of the legal and policy 
issues surrounding global warming and renewable energy solutions.  
We start with the role of electric power in the carbon mix and the 
emission of GHGs. 
B. The Electric Sector and the Solution for Greenhouse Gases 
Throughout history, human activities have been both constrained 
and enhanced by the Earth’s climate.  Modern human activities also 
have the power to change the Earth’s climate.  As early as 1896, 
Arrhenius found that carbon dioxide (CO2) can affect the climate, 
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and by 1938, English engineer G.S. Callendar recognized that 
increases in atmospheric CO2 were causing a warming trend.
2  Since 
the Industrial Revolution, emissions resulting from combusting fossil 
fuels for mechanical and electrical energy have poured into the 
atmosphere.3 
In 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
was established to study the complex interrelation between human 
activities and climate.4  The IPCC’s work appeared on the world 
media radar in 1995 when its second assessment report found 
evidence suggesting “that there is a discernible human influence on 
global climate.”5  Since 1995 we have seen many of the warmest years 
on record and dramatic increases in storm intensity and damage.6  
The effects of dramatic climate change are both numerous and 
dangerous, including: increased frequency of heat waves and extreme 
heat events; more intense precipitation events; increased droughts, 
floods, and monsoons; increased intensity of mid-latitude storms; 
increased range of tropical disease vectors; and dramatic species 
extinction events.7 
In 2007, the IPCC issued its summary report on the effects of 
global warming, which noted particular impacts on water resources, 
food production, ecosystems, and human health.8  A possible 
temperature rise of 3°C would leave up to thirty percent of species 
facing extinction and would decimate the marine coral population.9  
Food production and crop yields are likely to decrease in lower 
latitude areas, even if the global temperature increase is small.10  Crop 
yields are likely to increase in higher latitudes, even if the 
 
 2. Stephen Schneider, An Overview of the Climate Change Problem (Feb. 2005) http:// 
stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Climate/ClimateFrameset.html. 
 3. PEW CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101 at 1 (2007), http:// 
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate101-Complete-Jan09.pdf. 
 4. See id. 
 5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT: 
CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (1995). 
 6. See PEW CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3, at 2. 
 7. See Stephen H. Schneider & Janica Lane, An Overview of “Dangerous” Climate 
Change, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2006), available at http:// 
stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/Schneider-lane.pdf. 
 8. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO 
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007) available at http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/ar4.html. 
 9. Id. at 792. 
 10. Id. at 790. 
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temperature increase is between 1° and 3°C.11  Higher temperatures 
will also increase the concentration of ground-level ozone, leading to 
more rapid spread of infectious diseases. Forests will be increasingly 
affected by pests, disease, and fire, with extended periods of high fire 
risks and large increases in burned areas.12  Sea level will rise and 
coasts will experience more storm surges.13  A top official with the 
IPCC has indicated that developed nations will need to slash CO2 
emissions by 80% to 95% by 2050 to hold GHGs to 450 parts per 
million in the atmosphere.14 
At the height of the last Ice Age, temperatures were only 5°C 
cooler than now.15  Therefore, an increase of the magnitude predicted 
by the IPCC would be a major move. “Eleven of the past twelve years 
have been among the warmest dozen years on record”.16  GHG 
emissions in the 21st century are mainly a result of power generation.17  
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reports that 
approximately forty percent of aggregate U.S. carbon emissions 
contributing to climate change are related to coal-fired power 
generation.18  The single-point nature of power plant emissions, and 
the exploding demand for electricity, make electricity-generating 
plants a logical choice for the regulation of GHG emissions in the 
United States. 
Carbon dioxide is the primary GHG emitted by human activities 
in the United States, representing approximately 83.9% of total GHG 
emissions.19  “The largest source of CO2, and of overall greenhouse 
gas emissions, is fossil fuel combustion.”20  Thirty-six percent of that 
fossil fuel consumption, and in turn roughly forty percent of the CO2 
 
 11. Id. at 791–92. 
 12. Id. at 228–29. 
 13. Id. at 792. 
 14. Mitchell, Rick, IPCC Official Says Industrialized Nations Must Cut Emissions up to 95 
Percent, 39 ENV’T REP. 1917, 1917 (2008). 
 15. See J.R. PETIT ET AL., VOSTOK ICE CORE DATA FOR 420,000 YEARS (2001) available at 
http://imap.aims.ac.za/~irina/deutVostok.txt. 
 16. Sun in the Clear Over Global Warming, COSMOS, July 12, 2007, http:// 
www.cosmosmagazine.com/news/1451/sun-clear-over-global-warming?page=1. 
 17. For detailed coverage of the power industry law and regulation, see generally STEVEN 
FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER (West Group 2008) (1989). 
 18. Steven Ferrey, Corporate Responsibility and Carbon-Based Life Forms, 35 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 385, 451 (2008). 
 19. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
SINKS: 1990-2005 at ES-4 (2007). 
 20. Id. 
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from fossil fuel combustion, is from electricity generators.21  
“[E]lectricity generators rely on coal for over half of their total energy 
requirements.”22  Therefore, any successful GHG emission reduction 
plan will rely on reduction from the electricity sector. 
II. THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 
ALTERNATIVES IN THE POWER EQUATION 
One of the primary tools in combating increases in GHG 
emissions from electricity production is to increasing the use of 
renewable energy resources, many of which have zero net CO2 
emissions, to replace the use of fossil fuel sources for electricity.  
Even some leaders of the oil industry suggest that fifty percent of 
total global energy demand could be met by solar, wind, and other 
renewable resources by 2050.23  In addition to environmental and 
climate benefits, a renewable energy economy would have national 
security benefits by reducing importation of fuels, as well as reducing 
the vulnerability of the electricity grid to terrorist attack.24 
Solar energy is the source of all energy on earth, creating wind 
and water movement and ultimately creating plants,25 biomass, and 
animals, which become fossil fuels when their organic matter decays.  
The surface of the sun emits about 1300 W/m2 in the direction of the 
Earth.  One-third of the energy reaching the Earth is reflected back 
into space by the Earth’s atmosphere, yielding as much as 1000 W/m2 
at the surface of the Earth at noon on a cloudless day.  On average, 
over the hours of a year, about 170 W/m2 of solar radiation reach the 
Earth’s oceans, and about 180 W/m2 reach the land surfaces.26 
 
 21. Id. at ES-7. 
 22. Id. at ES-8. 
 23. See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE HYDROGEN ECONOMY: THE CREATION OF THE 
WORLDWIDE ENERGY WEB AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF POWER ON EARTH 189 (2002). 
 24. See ROSS GELBSPAN, BOILING POINT 176 (2004). 
 25. Plants are a significant source of energy.  Photosynthesis is an endothermic reaction 
requiring 2.8 MJ of solar radiation to synthesize one molecule of glucose from six molecules of 
CO2 and H2O.
   VACLAV SMIL, ENERGIES: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO THE BIOSPHERE AND 
CIVILIZATION 42 (1999).   Most of the terrestrial phytomass productivity in storage is in large 
trees in forests; phytoplankton species in the oceans store this mass in the hydrologic cycle. Id. 
at 46–48.  Phytoplankton productions are 65-80% of the terrestrial phytomass total, but 
phytoplankton has a life span of only one to five days.  Id. at 48.  The most voluminous trees are 
the most massive life forms on earth, with the most phytomass, and are even larger than blue 
whales in mass.  Id. at 51.   
 26. Id. at 5.  This results in total solar radiation annually of 2.7 x 1024 joules.  Id. at 6.  This 
amount of energy reaching the earth in the form of solar radiation is about 8,000 times more 
than worldwide consumption of fossil fuels and electricity during the early 1990s.  Id. 
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“Human capture of this energy is neither efficient nor 
prodigious.  Energy used by humankind on the Earth equals only 
[about] 0.01% of the total solar energy reaching the Earth.”27  Wind 
power’s global energy potential is thirty five times greater than world 
electricity use.28  Every seventy minutes, solar energy provides as 
much potential energy as humankind uses each year.29 
In fact, no nation on Earth uses more energy than the energy 
content contained in the sunlight that strikes its existing buildings 
every day. The solar energy that falls on roads in the United States 
each year contains roughly as much energy content as all the fossil 
fuel consumed in the world during that same year. 
Unlike finite fossil fuels, solar energy represents a constantly 
replenished flow, rather than an existing stock that is diminished by 
its use.  Tomorrow, the earth will have exactly as much solar energy 
as it has today, regardless of how much solar energy is used and 
consumed each day. By contrast, burning a barrel of oil or a cubic 
meter of natural gas diminishes permanently that quantity of fossil 
fuels for the next day and for future generations.30 
Many renewable energy projects, other than those using biomass 
fuels, do not involve combustion.  “They create mechanical shaft 
power from the movement of wind or water, tap naturally produced 
geologic steam, or employ solar energy to induce direct current on a 
chemical surface.”31  “Because renewable energy alternatives – solar, 
wind, hydro, geothermal – do not involve combustion to produce 
electric energy, they do not emit various criteria pollutants or GHGs 
during their operation.”32 
Only location limits solar, wind, and geothermal resources. [While] 
fossil fuel fired plants can be sited anywhere with appropriate fuel 
delivery and electricity transmission infrastructure, large renewable 
power plants can only be sited where renewable sources are present 
in large enough amounts and concentrations to make the capital 
investment in generation facilities feasible. But unlike fossil-fuel-
fired generation facilities, renewable energy resources are not 
limited by a finite fuel supply. 33 
 
 27. STEVEN FERREY & ANIL CABRAAL, RENEWABLE POWER IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: WINNING THE WAR ON GLOBAL WARMING 36 (2006). 
 28. Amory B. Lovins et al., Forget Nuclear, 24 ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. SOLUTIONS 1, 25 
(2008), available at http://www.rmi.org/images/PDFs/Newsletter/NLRMIspring08.pdf. 
 29. Id. 
 30. FERREY & CABRAAL, supra note 27, at 36. 
 31. Steven Ferrey, Why Electricity Matters, Developing Nations Matter, and Asia Matters 
Most of All, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 113, 134 (2007). 
 32. Id. 
 33. FERREY & CABRAAL, supra note 27, at 37. 
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What can be critical for renewable resources is adequate 
transmission capacity from the power generation source to 
consumers.34  “Electric T&D [transmission and distribution] facilities, 
telecommunications equipment, and oil and gas pipelines have long 
lives.”35 “Like a highway grid, once configured, locational and use 
patterns that grow up around that grid make it more difficult to 
reroute those electric highways.”36 
Renewable technologies must go to the place where they can be 
exploited.  Only in certain locations is the wind regime sufficient to 
turn large wind turbines; hydro power is limited to moving water 
courses; solar photovoltaic power, while ubiquitous, requires a 
large land or surface area to produce the equivalent amount of 
power as a large fossil fuel-fired facility (solar power is much less 
dense than fossil fuels – although solar collectors can be mounted 
on [sic] roofs or walls, or have dual uses, e.g., functioning as both a 
roof and electricity generator).37 
According to a 2007 report from the United Nations 
Environment Programme, investment capital flowing into renewable 
energy worldwide climbed from $80 billion in 2005 to $100 billion in 
2006. 
Despite the emergence of, and attention to, renewable energy 
sources . . . , forecasters do not see the international mix of power 
generation sources changing appreciably over the next several 
decades . . . .  [T]he percentage of fossil fuels in the mix—and thus 
the potential sources of GHGs in the electric power sector—are 
forecasted to remain relatively constant.  The International Energy 
Agency in Paris forecasts that by 2030, world demand for energy 
will grow by 59% and fossil fuel sources will still supply 82% of the 
total, with non-carbon renewable energy sources supplying only 
6%.38 
In response to this growing awareness, and due to the lack of 
United States federal regulations relating to climate change and 
renewable energy, states are developing their own aggressive 
incentives for renewable energy production.39 
Solar photovoltaic panels are most likely to generate power 
during peak times of the day when summer air conditioning demand 
is greatest.  According to one source, a few hundred additional 
 
 34. FERREY, supra note 17, § 2:11. 
 35. FERREY & CABRAAL, supra note 27, at 23. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 23–24. 
 38. Steven Ferrey, Power Paradox: The Algorithm of Carbon and International 
Development, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 510, 518 (2008). 
 39. See Steven Ferrey, Power Future, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 261, 284–87 (2005). 
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megawatts (MW) of photovoltaic generation located in or around 
each major metro area might have prevented the August 14, 2003 
blackout of the East Coast.40  The United States could tap 900,000 
MW of off-shore wind potential, much of it near urban areas along 
the Eastern seaboard, according to a U.S. Department of Energy 
report.41  The European Union forecasts that the Union will have at a 
minimum 40,000 MW of off-shore wind energy in place in the 
European Union by the year 2020.”42 
Although renewable resources are distributed across the United 
States and the world, they are not distributed evenly.  “Nine states 
east of the Mississippi River do not have any sub-regions with high 
wind resources . . . .  [S]ix states ranging from Virginia to 
Massachusetts . . . do not have any sub-regions with at least 250,000 
metric tons of currently available biomass [annually].”43  The 
northeastern region of the United States has relatively dense 
populations and significant electricity demand.  Although they have 
access to renewable resources, those renewable resources are not as 
concentrated as in other areas of the United States.  Absent the 
ability to generate energy on their own, urban areas are left with 
energy efficiency as a substitute for additional generation capacity 
that they require on a net basis.44 
III. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS TO FACILITATE RENEWABLE POWER 
Where renewable energy resources do exist, their deployment 
can be incentivized in a variety of ways.  Primarily, aside from global 
warming reduction requirements, these incentives include tax credits, 
 
 40. Steven Letendre & Richard Perez, Understanding the Benefits of Dispersed Grid-
Connected Photovoltaics: From Avoiding the Next Major Outage to Taming Wholesale Power 
Markets, ELECTRICITY J., July 2006, at 64, 68. 
 41. U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, GENERAL ELECTRIC, AND MASSACHUSETTS TECHNOLOGY 
COLLABORATIVE, A FRAMEWORK FOR OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2 (2005), available at http://www.masstech.org/offshore/final_09_20.pdf. 
 42. 40,000 MW by 2020: Building offshore wind in Europe, Renewableenergyworld.com, 
Jan./Feb. 2008, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/ news/reworld/story?id=51595. 
 43. Marilyn A. Brown et al., Reduced Emissions and Lower Costs: Combining Renewable 
Energy and Energy Efficiency into a Sustainable Energy Portfolio Standard, ELECTRICITY J., 
May 2007, at 62, 64.  These resources count agricultural residues, crops, animal manure, wood 
residues, municipal discarded materials and methane from landfill, as well as dedicated crop 
biomass.  Id. at 64 n.9.  With the exception of Florida, the eastern half of the United States is 
devoid of sub-regions capable of producing 6.0 kWh/m2/day with solar photovoltaic resources on 
south-facing structures and surfaces.  Id. at 64. 
 44. See generally MARILYN A. BROWN ET AL., TOWARDS A CLIMATE-FRIENDLY BUILT 
ENVIRONMENT (2005). 
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renewable trust funds, renewable portfolio standard requirements, 
and promotional feed-in tariffs paid for the sale and delivery of 
renewable energy. 
A. Tax Credits 
In the United States, the Production Tax Credit (PTC) set forth 
in section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code remains the cornerstone 
of federal policies supporting renewable energy.45  The PTC was 
originally enacted as part of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and has 
been periodically extended, with each extension lasting only for a 
limited period.46  Qualified facilities (QFs) are wind, closed-loop 
biomass, open-loop biomass, geothermal, small irrigation power, 
municipal solid waste, and qualified hydropower facilities.47  In 2006, 
the amount of the credit was $0.019 per kilowatt hour (kWh) 
generated by wind, closed-loop biomass, geothermal and solar48 
energy facilities, and $0.01per kWh for open-loop biomass, small 
irrigation power, landfill gas, trash combustion and qualified 
hydropower facilities.49  The PTC applies for ten years for wind and 
closed loop biomass and open-loop biomass built after August 8, 2005 
and five years for other QFs following the date that the QF was 
originally placed in service.  Despite the importance of the PTC, 
renewable power is additionally encouraged in certain states by other 
significant tax incentives.50 
 
 
 45. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 46. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 extended the PTC to qualified facilities 
placed in service before January 1, 2009.  Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-432, § 201, 120 Stat. 2922, 2944. 
 47. The PTC also applies to refined coal. 26 U.S.C. §§ 45(c)(7), (d)(8), (e)(8) (2006). 
 48. Section 710 of The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 extended the PTC to open–
loop biomass, geothermal energy, solar energy, small irrigation power, and municipal solid 
waste facilities.  American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 710, 181 Stat. 1418, 
1552–57.  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 extended the PTC to facilities placed in service before 
January 1, 2008, but the in-service date for solar energy facilities was not extended, and remains 
January 1, 2006. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1301, 119 Stat. 594, 986 (2005). 
 49. I.R.S. Notice 2006-51, 2006 IRB LEXIS 353, 2006-25 I.R.B. 1144, at *11–12 (June 19, 
2006). 
 50. According to the Department of Energy Funded Database of State Incentives for 
Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), twenty-six states offer some type of solar energy tax 
incentive with over 51 different types of programs.  Overall there are 228 different types of 
rebates available in the states for renewable energy.  See Rusty Haynes, N.C. Solar Center, N.C. 
State University Solar America Cities Annual Meeting (April 15, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://www.dsireusa.org/solar/library). 
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Many European countries also use tax subsidies to promote 
renewable power development.  For example, in Sweden, the value of 
financial subsidies to wind projects is approximately $0.025 per kWh.51 
B. System Benefits Charges/Renewable Trust Funds 
A system benefits charge (SBC) is a tax on utility consumption, 
or a surcharge mechanism, for collecting funds from electric 
consumers, the proceeds of which then support a range of energy 
activities.  In order to support demand-side management programs, 
or renewable resources, a system benefits charge is used to 
inconspicuously collect funds, which then support a range of energy 
activities, from electricity consumers52 so that those technologies can 
compete in price with more conventional technologies.53 
Between 1998 and 2012, approximately $3.5 billion will be 
collected by the original fourteen states with existing renewable 
system benefit charges to endow energy trust funds.  More than half 
the amount collected—at least $135 million per year—comes from 
California alone. 54  As of 2006, state’s energy trust funds had 
committed almost $400 million to support 2249 MW of renewable 
energy capacity.55  Most of these state programs only provide financial 
assistance to new projects, to the exclusion of existing renewable 
projects prior to program implementation.56  Approximately half of 
this capacity had been constructed, while the other half was in the 
development stage.57  “The funding levels [of these state charges on 
electric distribution] range from $0.07 per MWh in Wisconsin up to  
 
 
 
 
 51. A. Kovski & J. Fordney, Specialist Detail Essentials For Renewables: Subsidies, 
Mandates And More Transmission, PLATTS ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK, Mar. 10, 2008 at 7, 8. 
 52. FERREY, supra note 17, § 10:95. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Steven Ferrey, Renewable Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State 
Level, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2006, at 52, 53. 
 55. M. BOLINGER & R. WISER, THE IMPACT OF STATE CLEAN ENERGY FUND SUPPORT 
FOR UTILITY-SCALE RENEWABLE PROJECT 2 (May 2006), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ 
ea/EMS/cases/LBNL-56422.pdf. 
 56. Ferrey, supra note 54, at 53. 
 57. See BOLINGER & WISER, supra note 55, at 7. 
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almost $0.6 per MWh in Massachusetts.”58  The mean value is 
about $0.01 per kWh of consumption.59 
The form of administration of renewable trust funds varies.  Many 
states administer them through a state agency, while others use a 
quasi-public business development organization.  Some funds are 
managed by independent third-party organizations, some by 
existing utilities, while two states allow large customers to self-
direct the funds.  For distribution, some states utilize an investment 
model, making loans and equity investments.  Other states provide 
financial incentives for production or grants to stimulate supply-
side development.  Some other states use research and 
development grants, technical assistance, education, and 
demonstration projects.60 
As of 2001, the only state program to provide assistance to entities 
outside of the state with its trust funds was Rhode Island, which 
provided a grant to a wind project in Massachusetts that was in 
danger of losing its construction permits.  It is reported that 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania have expressed a 
willingness to fund out-of-state projects.  In critiquing these 
projects and the hesitancy of the majority of states to fund out-of-
state projects, two different federally funded national energy 
research laboratories highlight this only as a practical concern.  In 
fact, there are significant legal issues raised by such taxation of 
interstate electricity sales to fund exclusively in-state renewable 
energy projects.61 
Table 1 provides an illustration of these state programs in the 
Northeast. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58. Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning 
the Energy Future through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
507, 524 (2004). 
 59. MARTIN KUSHLER, ET AL., FIVE YEARS IN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FIRST HALF-
DECADE OF PUBLIC BENEFIT ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES 10, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN 
ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. REP. NO. U041, April 2004. 
 60. Ferrey, supra note 58, at 524–25. 
 61. Id. at 640. 
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Table 1: Seven Northeast State Public Benefits Funding Renewable Projects 
State Funding  Renewables Uses and Eligibility 
Connecticut 0.5 mills/kWh in 200062 
0.75 mills in 2002 
1 mill in 2004 - $28 million/year 
average through 2012 
Fund reduced by approx. 33% in FY04 
and for next 7 years to pay back bonds 
issued to cover state budget deficit. 
Solar, wind, ocean thermal, wave, 
tidal, landfill gas, low emission 
biomass, fuel cells.  Economic 
development and renewables for 
customers. 
May invest in out-of-state renewable 
projects. 
Massachusetts Averages 0.95 mills/kWh first 5 years = 
$40 million per year. 0.25 mills 
dedicated for MSW pollution controls 
or retirement. 
0.5 mills thereafter (no MSW) ~$20-
$25 million/year. 
New solar, wind, ocean, advanced 
biomass, fuel cells, possibly DSM and 
distribution generation. 
New Jersey 1.8 mills/kWh for energy efficiency and 
Class I renewables for first 4 years; 2.1 
mills/kWh next 4 years (min. of $107.5 
million/yr through 2008). 
75% of funds for efficiency $9~105 
million/yr avg) 
25% of funds for Class I renewables 
(~$35 million/yr avg) 
2001 BPU Order sets initial 3 year 
(2001-2003) funding level at $358.5 
million (75% for efficiency, 25% of 
Class I renewables). 
Class I renewables (wind, PV, solar 
thermal, biomass, fuel cells, LFG, 
wave/tidal, and geothermal.) 
Allocation of renewable energy funds 
is 60% customer sites, 40% grid 
supply in 2001, and split 50/50 each 
year thereafter. 
New York 0.6 – 1.0 mills/kWh per utility; avg. ~0.7 
mills 
~$78 million/yr for 3 years (1999-2001) 
Efficiency = 67%; renewables/R&D = 
18%; low-income = 14% 
$17 million over three years for 
renewables (including $4 million from 
Niagara Mohawk) 
Fund extended at $150 million/yr for 5 
years.  $70 million over 5 years for 
renewables, including $47.5 million for 
Wind, solar, biomass. 
Competitive bidding by technology. 
Funding programs include grants, 
loans, guarantees, investments, buy 
downs, and rebates. 
 
 62. A mill is one-tenth of one cent. 
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Table 1: Seven Northeast State Public Benefits Funding Renewable Projects 
State Funding  Renewables Uses and Eligibility 
wind power, and the rest for biomass 
and solar. 
Rhode Island 2.3 mills/kWh 1997-2012, (2.0 
mills/kWh for DSM programs and 0.3 
mills/kWh for renewables) 
~$17 million/yr, with 2.5 million/yr for 
renewable 
Wind, solar, sustainable, biomass, 
existing hydro 100 MW or less. 
 
As Table 2 illustrates, the funding level is in the range of $175 to 
$250 million annually for the cumulative impact of the fourteen state 
renewable energy system benefit charge and trust fund programs.63  
“While many of these programs are set up to run indefinitely, others 
have set life-spans.  The level of per capita funding ranges from 
$0.90–$4.40 annually for renewable energy.  Expressed another way, 
for each megawatt hour sold in the state, the level of subsidy ranges 
from $0.07–$0.59.” 64 
 
Table 2: Renewable System Benefit Funding Levels and Program Duration65 
State Approximate Annual 
Funding ($million) 
Per-Capita 
Annual Funding 
Per-MWh 
Funding 
Funding Duration 
 
CA 
 
$135 
 
$4.0 
 
$0.58 
 
1998 - 2011 
 
CT 
 
$15 - $30 
 
$4.4 
 
$0.50 
 
2000 - indefinite 
 
DE 
 
$1 (maximum) 
 
$1.3 
 
$0.09 
 
10/1999 - indefinite 
 
IL 
 
$5 
 
$0.4 
 
$0.04 
 
1998-2007 
 
MA 
 
$30 - $20 
 
$4.7 
 
$0.59 
 
1998 - indefinite 
 
MT 
 
$2 
 
$2.2 
 
$0.20 
 
1999 - July 2003 
 
NJ 
 
$30 
 
$3.6 
 
$0.43 
 
2001-2008 
     
 
 63. Id. at 525. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 526–27. 
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NM $4 $2.2 $0.22 2007 - indefinite 
 
NY 
 
$6 - $14 
 
$0.7 
 
$0.11 
 
7/1998 - 6/2006 
 
OH 
 
$15 - $5 (portion of) 
 
$1.3 
 
$0.09 
 
2001 - 2010 
 
OR 
 
$8.6 
 
$2.5 
 
$0.17 
 
10/2001 - 9/2010 
 
PA 
 
$10.8 (portion of) 
 
$0.9 
 
$0.08 
 
1999 - indefinite 
 
RI 
 
$2 
 
$1.9 
 
$0.28 
 
1997 - 2002 
 
WI 
 
$1 - $4.8 
 
$0.9 
 
$0.07 
 
4/1999 – indefinite 
C. PURPA Renewable Power Purchase Obligations 
Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978 (PURPA) as part of a legislative initiative “designed to combat 
the nationwide energy crisis.”66  Even though PURPA was somewhat 
restricted by changes in federal law in 2005, its requirement that 
regulated retail utilities purchase renewable power from QFs, was 
and remains a primary incentive for renewable power development.67  
In an effort to reduce United States consumption of fossil fuels and 
reliance on foreign energy supplies, Congress sought to promote the 
development of alternative energy sources, including cogeneration 
and small power production.68  Prior to PURPA, an independent 
cogenerator or small power producer seeking to interconnect with an 
electric utility confronted at least three primary obstacles: 69 
 Some utilities used their monopoly power to refuse to 
purchase electric power generated by such sources, and 
refused to interconnect with the facility, or offered the 
QF inadequate prices for a purchase.70 
 
 66. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745 (1982). 
 67. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006). 
 68. See Steven Ferrey, Exit Strategy: State Legal Discretion to Environmentally Sculpt the 
Deregulated Electric Environment, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 129–33 (2002). 
 69. See Steven Ferrey, Nothing But Net: Renewable Energy and the Environment, 
MidAmerica Legal Fictions, and Supremacy Doctrine, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (2003). 
 70. Steven R. Miles, Full-Avoided Cost Pricing Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act: “Just and Reasonable” to Electric Consumers?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1267 (1984). 
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 Some utilities charged those entities that cogenerated 
discriminatory rates for supplementary, back-up, and 
maintenance service.71 
 Federal and state laws posed a problem for an 
interconnected cogenerator or small power producer 
[QF] in that it could subject itself to plenary public utility 
regulation, under either the Federal Power Act and/or 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act.72 
The purpose of Congress in enacting PURPA section 210 was to 
eliminate these obstacles.73  Under PURPA, if a power generation 
project satisfies specified legal requirements, it is characterized as a 
QF and is entitled to regulatory benefits.74  A QF produces electric 
energy solely by the use of biomass, waste, renewable resources, 
geothermal resources or any combination thereof, and is not greater 
in gross capacity than eighty megawatts unless it also cogenerates 
power.75 
PURPA requires that the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) establish regulations that obligate 
public utilities to sell electric energy to and purchase power 
from QFs [at nondiscriminatory prices]. PURPA also 
specifies that the rates established by FERC for these 
purchases may not exceed the “incremental cost” to the 
utility of purchasing alternative electric energy.  This 
“incremental cost” is defined as the cost to the electric utility 
of the electric energy which, but for the purchase from such  
[QF], such utility would generate or purchase from another 
source.76 
Electric utilities must offer to sell necessary backup,77 
interruptible,78 maintenance,79 or supplemental80 power to QFs.  
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1268–69. 
 74. Ferrey, supra note 68, at 136–42. 
 75. 16 U.S.C. § 796 (2006). 
 76. Plymouth Rock Energy Assocs. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 648 N.E.2d 752, 754 (Mass. 
1995) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d)) (citations omitted); see also Ferrey, supra note 68, at 138–
41. 
 77. Backup power is electric energy or capacity during an unscheduled outage to supply 
power and is generally self-generated.  18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(9). 
 78. Interruptible power is power or capacity supplied by an electric utility to a QF subject 
to interruption under specific conditions.  18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(10). 
 79. Maintenance power is power or capacity supplied by an electric utility to a QF during 
periods of scheduled outages.  18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(11). 
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PURPA requires that such power sales by an electric utility to a QF 
be nondiscriminatory and “just and reasonable and in the public 
interest.”81  Essentially, there must be a cost basis and fair justification 
for any QF power sale activity that is inconsistent with economic 
principles. 
Commentators argue that QF buyback rates calculated under the 
PURPA avoided-cost principal are not adequate since the wholesale 
power buyback rates “capture only a fraction” of the environmental 
and distributed benefits of deployment of the technology to society.82  
They argue that at a minimum, buy-back rates should be calculated 
based on the full value to society, including energy, capacity value, 
and distribution system value or “total facility avoided cost.”83 
The Energy Policy Act (EP Act) of 200584 added section 210(m) 
to PURPA, which permits the termination of an electric utility’s 
obligation to purchase energy from QFs if FERC finds that the QF 
has nondiscriminatory access to wholesale electric markets.85  If 
FERC finds that the QF has non-discriminatory access, it would 
eliminate “the QF purchase mandate for utilities operating in the 
organized markets that have so-called ‘Day 2 markets’ —MISO, ISO-
New England, PJM, and NYISO—because they offer transparent 
spot markets into which all generators can sell” power.86  FERC 
 
 80. Supplementary power is power or capacity supplied by an electric utility to a QF to 
augment self-generated electricity.  18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(8). 
 81. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305(a). 
 82. AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., SMALL IS PROFITABLE: THE HIDDEN BENEFITS OF MAKING 
ELECTRICAL RESOURCES THE RIGHT SIZE 331–32 (2002). 
 83. See id. 
 84. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1253, 119 Stat. 594 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006)). 
 85. PURPA 210(m)(1) sets out the following criteria for non-discriminatory markets: 
(A)(i) independently administered, auction-based day ahead and real time wholesale 
markets for the sale of electric energy; and (ii) wholesale markets for long term sales of 
capacity and electric energy; or 
(B)(i) transmission and interconnection services that are provided by a Commission-
approved regional transmission entity and administered pursuant to an open access 
transmission tariff that affords nondiscriminatory treatment to all customers; and (iii) 
competitive wholesale markets that provide a meaningful opportunity to sell capacity, 
including long-term and short-term and real-time sales to buyers other than the utility 
to which the qualifying facility is interconnected.  In determining whether a meaningful 
opportunity to sell exists, the commission shall consider, among other factors, evidence 
of transactions within the relevant market; or 
(C) wholesale markets for the sale of capacity and electric energy that are, at a 
minimum, of comparable competitive quality as markets described in subparagraphs 
(A) and (B). 
16 U.S.C. § 210(m)(1) (2006). 
 86. Andrea Robinson, Proposed Rule Would End PURPA “Put” in Some Power Markets, 
Jan. 24 2006, http://www.energylegalblog.com/archives/2006/01/24/1602. 
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regulations provide that in Day 2 markets there is a rebuttable 
presumption that a QF with a capacity above 20 MW has non-
discriminatory access to a wholesale market as defined in PURPA 
section 210(m)(1)(A).87 An electric utility member of a Day 2 market 
must file an application with FERC for relief from the purchase 
requirement.88 
On January 19, 2006, FERC issued a notice of proposed 
rulemaking.89  On October 20, 2006, FERC issued Order No. 688 as a 
Final Rule to implement PURPA section 210(m).90  This order found 
that five Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) afforded non-
discriminatory market access to QFs and placed the burden on the 
QFs in these five RTO areas to demonstrate that the market does not 
afford them non-discriminatory access in order to maintain their 
power purchase entitlements.  In Order 688, FERC found that 
Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator (Midwest 
ISO), PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), ISO New England, Inc. 
(ISO-NE), and New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) 
qualify as markets [with non-discriminatory access] described in § 
292.309(a)(1)(i) and (ii), and there is a rebuttable presumption that 
qualifying facilities with a capacity greater than 20 megawatts have 
nondiscriminatory access to those markets through Commission-
approved open access transmission tariffs and interconnection 
rules, and that electric utilities that are members of such regional 
transmission organizations or independent system operators 
(RTO/ISOs) should be relieved of the obligation to purchase 
electric energy from the qualifying facilities.91 
In May 2007, FERC ruled that QF obligations were no longer to 
be imposed on utilities owned by Duke Energy in the Midwest under 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005.92 
 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 292.310 (2006). 
 88. Id. 
 89. New PURPA 210(m) Regulations Applicable to Small Power Cogeneration Facilities, 
71 Fed. Reg. 4532 (proposed Jan. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 292). 
 90. New PURPA 210(m) Regulations Applicable to Small Power Cogeneration Facilities, 
71 Fed. Reg. 64,342 (final rule) (issued Oct. 20, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 292), aff’d 
on appeal, Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 550 F.3d 1179 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008). 
 91. 18 C.F.R. § 292.309(e) (2009).  FERC also found that the California Independent 
System Operator and the Southwest Power Pool satisfy the criteria for transmission and 
interconnection services provided by an approved RTO and administered pursuant to open-
access transmission tariff affording nondiscriminatory treatment.  18 C.F.R. § 292.309(g) (2009).  
FERC also found that ERCOT is a market of comparable competitive quality to Midwest ISO, 
PJM, ISO-NE and NYISO.  18 C.F.R. § 292.309(f) (2009). 
 92. In re Duke Energy Shared Servs. Inc., 119 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,146 (May 17, 2007). 
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The burden will be on the utility to demonstrate that the small 
QF has non-discriminatory access to the market.93  By contrast, 
PURPA section 210(m) and FERC Order No. 688 do not modify the 
“rights or remedies of any party under any contract or obligation, in 
effect or pending approval before the appropriate state regulatory 
authority on non-regulated electric utility on or before August 8, 
2005.”94  If FERC determines that in 2006 or later, QFs have non-
discriminatory market access, they are allowed to relieve utilities of 
the QF power purchase obligation.  Having open access to the spot 
markets in RTOs does not necessarily mean that there is access to 
long-term markets on a non-discriminatory basis. 
IV. RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS AS THE STATE ELIXIR 
A. RPS Design and Contours 
An alternative to feed-in tariffs is state mandatory minimum 
renewable energy supply requirements, which are usually imposed on 
electric utilities or independent retail suppliers.  These alternatives 
typically are known as Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs). 
“A resource portfolio requirement requires certain electricity 
sellers and/or buyers to maintain a predetermined percentage of 
designated clean resources in their wholesale supply mix.”95  Contrary 
to SBCs, RPS programs transfer the risks and benefits of achieving a 
percentage of renewables to the private sector.  “The key to making 
the portfolio requirements work is to establish trading schemes for 
‘portfolio obligations.’”96  “The standards become self-enforcing as a 
condition of retail sale licensure.”97  “The advantage[ ] of a portfolio 
standard is that it does not subsidize any particular technology or 
locus of that technology.”98  “Resource portfolio requirements can be 
applied under any wholesale or retail competition, without placing 
any entities at a disadvantage.”99 
State RPS program designs vary as to 
 Energy versus capacity obligations; 
 Single-tier or multi-tier credit determinations; 
 
 93. 18 C.F.R. § 292.309(d) (2009). 
 94. 18 C.F.R. § 292.314 (2009). 
 95. Ferrey, supra note 58, at 529. 
 96. Id. at 530. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 530–31. 
 99. Id. at 531. 
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 Duration of purchase obligations; 
 Requirements for resource diversity; 
 Incentives for resource or technology diversity; 
 Participation requirements for default service providers; 
 Geographic eligibility for credits; 
 Differentiation by type of renewable resource; 
 Rules governing which generation units can earn credits; 
 Definitions of new or incremental generation, where 
applicable; 
 Categorization of multi-fuel facilities and off-grid 
resources; and, 
 Eligibility of customer-side distributed generation. 
Half of the U.S. states have enacted RPS programs to promote 
renewable energy power production.  Half of that half employ 
differentiated tiers of Renewable Energy Credits or Certificates 
(RECs).100  Some states distinguish tiers of RECs by the year in which 
the REC was created101 or the type of renewable resource used in 
creation of the REC, so as to promote certain technologies.102  Some 
states create technology set-asides or bands of technology.103  Other 
states have only a single type, or tier, of REC regardless of the 
technology used to create the REC, with only newly constructed 
renewable energy projects permitted to sell RECs.104  Other states 
 
 100. RECs are a regulatorily-created embodiment of the renewable attribute of a unit of 
electric power generation.  Typically representing one megawatt-hour of power generation from 
a renewable or alternative electric power generation source, as defined in state law, that 
registers with a particular state to simultaneously create such RECs as an additional element of 
its generation.  These RECs, after creation, are sold to retail electricity sellers in the state, which 
are required each year to have a designated percentage of their power to be generated by such 
renewable or alternative technologies.  As a condition on the supply of power at retail, 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, that create RECs, impose requirements on retail suppliers of 
power, as a mechanism to subsidize the construction of new renewable generating sources.  
These subsidies do not have to be funded with tax monies, but instead become largely invisible 
increases in the cost of electric power, which are passed on in higher rates to consumers of this 
essential product or service. 
 101. Rhode Island and Delaware (partially) have such systems.  Database of State 
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Rules Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/rrpre.cfm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009). 
 102. Such states include Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, Washington DC, and Texas 
(partially).  Id. 
 103. Arizona, Colorado, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania and Washington DC are examples of this.  Id. 
 104. Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana (for out-of-state projects) and the Minnesota program 
covering XCEL are examples of this.  Id. 
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have a single tier that allows both new and existing projects to 
qualify.105  This creates myriad variations on state RPS models. 
B. RPS State Variations and Results 
RPS programs exist in twenty-five states and the District of 
Columbia; four more states have nonbinding RPS goals.106  “In 2007, 
four states established new RPS policies, eleven states significantly 
revised pre-existing RPS programs . . . and three states created non-
binding renewable energy goals.”107  These mandatory RPS programs 
cover forty-six percent of nationwide retail electricity sales.108  RPS 
programs were initially created in states that had restructured and/or 
deregulated their retail power markets; however, over time, half of 
the RPS programs were being created in traditional monopolized 
states.  Representative northeast state RPS programs are illustrated 
in Table 3. 
The evolution of RPS programs occurred over the past fifteen 
years.  Iowa and Massachusetts established renewable portfolio 
standards in 1991 and 1997, respectively.109  By the end of 2007, more 
than twenty-five states and the District of Columbia had enacted RPS 
policies requiring that over time, between two and forty percent of 
electricity come from renewable energy sources.110  Among the most 
populous states, California has a thirty-three percent RPS target by 
2020 and New York has a twenty-four target by 2013. 111 
The RPS programs in the states are very different in terms of 
what qualifies as a renewable resource.  Most states allow solar, wind, 
biomass, and landfill gas resources to qualify in RPS programs; 
however, states are less consistent regarding eligibility for biogas, 
MSW, geothermal, all hydro resources, fuel cells and ocean tidal 
 
 105. California (partially), Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Montana (for in-state 
projects), New Mexico, New York (partially), Nevada, Pennsylvania, Texas (partially), and 
Wisconsin are examples of this.  Id. 
 106. RYAN WISER & GALEN BARBOSE, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A STATUS REPORT WITH DATA THROUGH 2007, REPORT NO. LBNL 154E, at 
1 (2008).  In 2007, Illinois, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Oregon established new RPS 
policies.  Id. at 35 tbl.A-1. 
 107. Id. at 1. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 4 fig.2. 
 110. K.S. CORY & B.G. SWEZEY, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE 
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN THE STATES: BALANCING GOALS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
STRATEGIES, REPORT NO. NREL/TP-670-41409, at 1 fig.1 (2007). 
 111. Id. at 1 fig.1, fig.22. 
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renewable resources.112  Some states count co-generation, while 
Pennsylvania includes coal gasification and non-renewable distributed 
generation.113  “Resource eligibility in state RPS programs has 
expanded beyond traditional renewables, with three states now 
allowing demand-side energy efficiency to meet at least a portion of 
their RPS requirement.”114  Some states set standards based on a 
percentage of installed capacity, while others set standards based on a 
percentage of total electricity sales.115  Some states allow credits to be 
traded, while other states do not.116 
In about half of the RPS programs, solar energy installations are 
being encouraged in a variety of ways.117  Several states award rebates 
to customers who install solar systems.118  Solar-specific RPS designs 
in eleven states and Washington D.C. include solar or distributed 
generation set-asides for a percentage of eligible projects.119  These 
set-aside policies have already supported 102 MW of solar 
photovoltaics and 65 MW of solar-thermal electric capacity.120  
Roughly 6700 MW of solar capacity would be needed by 2025 to fully 
meet existing set-aside requirements.121 
Eligible project technologies are set forth in Table 4. 
 
TABLE 3: Portfolio Standards and Trust Funds in Early Adopter States122 
State Name Renewable Energy Trust Fund Portfolio Standards 
Arizona X X 
California X  
Colorado  X 
Connecticut X X 
Delaware X  
 
 112. Id. at 4 tbl.1. 
 113. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Big IS Beautiful: The Case for Federal 
Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 48, 50. 
 114. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 11 & tbl.4. 
 115. Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 113, at 50. 
 116. Id. at 2. 
 117. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 27 n.21. 
 118. Id. at 11–12, tbl.3. 
 119. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 1. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. The number of types of RPS programs evolves constantly.  For a current inventory of 
the state of RPS programs, see Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, 
Summary Maps, http://www.dsireusa.org/summarymaps/index.cfm?ee=1&RE=1 (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2009). 
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Hawaii  X 
Illinois X  
Iowa  X 
Maine  X 
Maryland  X 
Massachusetts X X 
Minnesota  X X 
Montana X  
Nevada  X 
New Jersey X X 
New Mexico  X 
New York X  
Ohio X  
Oregon X  
Pennsylvania X X 
Rhode Island X  
Texas  X 
Vermont  X 
Wisconsin X X 
 
Table 4: “Renewable” Resources as Defined in State Statutes123 
State Solar Wind Fuel Cell Methane/Landfill Biomass Trash-to-
Energy 
Arizona X X   X  
California X X  X X X 
Connecticut X X X X X X 
Iowa X X X  X  
Illinois X X   X X 
Maine X X X  X X 
Maryland X X X X X  
Massachusetts X X X X X X 
Minnesota   X   X  
Nevada X X X    
New Jersey X X X X X X 
New Mexico X X X X X X 
New York X X    X 
Oregon X X  X  X 
Pennsylvania X X  X X X 
 
 123. Id. 
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Rhode Island X X  X X X 
Texas X X  X X X 
Wisconsin X X X X X X 
Table 4: “Renewable” Resources as Defined in State Statutes (continued) 
State Hydro Tidal Geothermal Photovoltaic Dedicated Crops 
Arizona  X  X  
California X  X X  
Connecticut X   X  
Iowa    X  
Illinois X   X X 
Maine X X X X  
Maryland  X X X  
Massachusetts X X  X X 
Minnesota       
Nevada   X X  
New Jersey X X X X  
New Mexico X X X X  
New York X X X X  
Oregon X X X X X 
Pennsylvania X  X X X 
Rhode Island X   X  
Texas X X X X  
Wisconsin X X X  X 
Note: Photovoltaic is included within solar in some states; methane or trash-to-energy may be 
included within a broad definition of “biomass.”124 
RPS programs have had an impact on the move in the United 
States to more deployment of renewable power projects.  Over fifty 
percent of the non-hydro renewable capacity additions in the U.S. for 
the decade from 1998 through 2007 occurred in states with RPS 
programs.  Ninety-three percent of these renewable electric 
generation additions in all states came from wind power, four percent 
from biomass, two percent from solar, and one percent from 
geothermal resources.125  In those states that have RPS programs, 
more than ninety percent of renewable energy additions (and more 
than eighty percent of average capacity supplied) is from wind power, 
with biomass a distant second and limited geothermal resource 
development.126  It is estimated that between sixty and ninety percent 
 
 124. Ferrey, supra note 54. 
 125. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 1. 
 126. Id. 
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of RPS-driven renewable energy capacity additions going forward will 
be wind power projects.127  It has also been estimated that RPSs 
motivated approximately forty-five percent of the 4300 MW of wind 
power installed in the United States between 2001 and the end of 
2004.128  An additional fifteen percent of these installations were 
motivated by state renewable energy trust funds and subsidies. 129 
There are a variety of nuances and idiosyncrasies state-by-state.  
RECs for RPS compliance have different longevities and shelf lives. 
“The shelf life of a REC . . . can be as short as three months (in New 
England) to as long as four years (in Nevada and Wisconsin).”130  
Massachusetts utilizes a confined period to transfer credits from 
generators to retail suppliers but allows banking for two years of up 
to thirty percent of the annual RPS requirement; Delaware, Maryland 
along with the District of Columbia extend banking to a three-year 
period, and California allows indefinite banking which perpetually 
guarantees the longevity of credits once created as a function of 
renewable power generation.131  In some cases where RECs have 
shorter life spans, they can be banked from one year to the next to 
meet a certain percentage of the next year’s annual requirement.132 
States employing RPS programs treat customer-side generation 
differently.  While Massachusetts and Rhode Island only allow these 
resources to earn RECs if they are located within the respective state, 
Connecticut allows such facilities to earn credits when situated 
elsewhere in the New England region.133 
There are several regional tracking systems in operation for 
renewable energy attributes:134 the NEPOOL GIS, the PJM-EIS 
 
 127. Ryan Wiser and Mark Bolinger, Balancing Cost and Risk:  The Treatment of Renewable 
Energy in Western Utility Resource Plans, ELECTRICITY J., January 2006, at 48. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 5. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See ANDREW SCHWARTZ, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
CERTIFICATES AND THE CALIFORNIA RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD PROGRAM 28 
(2006) (discussing banking in the California RPS). 
 133. Application of Pratt & Whitney for Connecticut Renewable Generator Qualification – 
Cape Cod Community College Fuel Cell, Docket No. 04-05-13-RE01, 2005 WL 2293281 (Conn. 
Dep’t of Pub. Utils. July 28, 2005) (reopening docket). 
 134. Renewable energy attributes include RECs, and can also include any regulatory credits 
at the state or federal levels with regard to regulation of global warming gases and criteria 
pollutant emissions.  These are credits created by law to represent the nature or quality of the 
environmental benefits associated with certain power generation technologies. 
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GATS, the WREGIS, and the M-RET.135  In addition to the 
electronic REC tracking systems in place, Wisconsin also can 
electronically track RPS within each state,136 as well as in 
Texas/ERCOT and New Jersey (only for solar energy).137  Large 
portions of the south, outside of Texas, do not have the ability to 
track RECs.138  “Because the definitions of . . . RECs created under 
various state programs differ, there is significant geographic 
limitation in cross-market REC trading and liquidity.”139 
Non-compliance penalties vary by state.140  Average RPS 
compliance in 2006 was ninety-four.141  Alternative compliance 
payments of more than $18 million were paid in 2006; financial 
penalties have been applied in two states.142  The non-compliance or 
alternative payment penalty ranges from around $0.05 per kWh in 
California, Connecticut, Washington, Rhode Island, Maine and 
Massachusetts, to lower amounts in other states (although New Jersey 
and New Hampshire have equally high penalties for non-compliance 
with Class I resources).143  In 2005, sixty-two of the Massachusetts 
RPS requirements were satisfied, while power sellers were required 
to pay state penalties of $53.19 per MWh for the unsatisfied thirty-
eight percent.144 
The required percentage of energy delivered from renewables 
ranges from 2% to 30% of annual retail sales in different state 
programs, but these numbers can be deceiving, depending upon 
whether electricity produced by preexisting renewable resources are 
eligible to be counted.145  Maine is at the thirty percent level.146  A 2007 
 
 135. EDWARD A. HOLT & RYAN H. WISER, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., THE 
TREATMENT OF RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES, EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES, AND GREEN 
POWER PROGRAMS IN STATE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS, REPORT NO. LBNL-
62574, at 7 (2007). 
 136. Ryan Wiser et al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United 
States, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 8, 12. 
 137. HOLT & WISER, supra note 135, at 7. 
 138. See id. at 7 fig. 3. 
 139. Steven Ferrey, When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal 
“Additionality” Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 591, 626 (2009). 
 140. See CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 16 tbl.5. 
 141. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 1. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 16 tbl.5. 
 144. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., ANNUAL RPS COMPLIANCE 
REPORT FOR 2005, at 4 (2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/Eoeea/docs/doer/rps/rps-
2005annual-rpt.pdf [hereinafter MASS. 2005 RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT]. 
 145. Ferrey, supra note 139, at 626. 
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amendment to the Maine RPS program now requires renewable 
power to be percent of capacity by 2017, starting at one percent in 
2008 and increasing by one percent annually.147  The penalty for 
noncompliance was set at $57.12 per MWh in 2007, which will rise 
with inflation, and can be waived by the Public Utilities Commission 
(PUC).148  Failure to comply can result in license revocation or other 
financial penalties.149 
Rhode Island requires that 3% of the electricity portfolio be 
renewable energy starting in 2007, rising to sixteen percent in 2020. 150  
An alternative compliance payment of $50 per MWh in 2003 dollars 
can be made in lieu of meeting the portfolio standard.151  Buyers also 
can “bank” renewable certificates for up to two years for future use.152  
Connecticut will recognize RPS credits from other states in the 
NEPOOL system until 2010, and thereafter will additionally 
recognize credits from New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Maryland or Delaware if it is determined at that time that their RPS 
program standards are similar to those of Connecticut.153  The details 
of Northeast state’s RPS programs are illustrated in Table 5. 
Fitch Ratings154 estimated in 2006 that the initial phase of U.S. 
cap-and-trade CO2 emission reductions will cost electric utilities 
approximately $6.5 billion annually.155  Where it is directly sourcing 
power, the Department of Defense must seek RECs for their military 
 
 146. Id. at 627 tbl.4. 
 147. Tom Tiernan, EEI Says some RPS targets ‘Unachievable’ as Industry deals with 
Infrastructure Debate, PLATTS ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK, May 5 2008, at 7. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ELECTRICITY FROM RENEWABLE RESOURCES: STATUS, 
PROSPECTS, AND IMPEDIMENTS 247 (2009), available at http://books.nap.edu/ 
openbook.php?record_id=12619&page=1. 
 151. Union of Concerned Scientists, Rhode Island Renewable Energy Standard Summary 6, 
at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/rhode-island.pdf. 
 152. Id. 
 153. DPUC Review of RPS Standards and Trading Programs in New York, Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, Maryland and Delaware, Docket No. 04-01-13, 2005 WL 3571725 (Conn. Dep’t of 
Pub. Utils. Nov. 9, 2005). 
 154. The Fitch Group is a global rating agency that provides the world’s credit markets with 
credit opinions.  It is a majority-owned subsidiary of Fimalac, S.A., Paris, France. For additional 
information, see www.fitchratings.com. 
 155. Fitch Puts Utilities' Initial CO2 Program Cost at $6.5 Bil; It Sees Cap-and-Trade 
Imminent, PLATTS ELECTRIC. UTIL. WEEK, November 13, 2006, at 10.  This was modeled on a 
RGGI-capped model with carbon allowances trading at $10/allowance.  It also concluded that 
thousands of megawatts of electric generation capacity would have to be replaced with zero-
emission energy sources. 
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bases’ procurement of power in states where there are RPS 
requirements.156  Analyses by the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration157 and the Union of Concerned Scientists158 forecast 
that RPS systems can depress retail power prices by reducing the 
demand for, and therefore the price of, fossil-fuel-fired generation 
resources; reduce dependence on fossil fuels; promote renewable 
energy development; and significantly reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions. 
 
Table 5: Seven Northeast State RPS Requirements159 
State Requirement Technology Eligibility REC 
Prices 
Trading 
Connecticut 
3 Classes 
Class I technologies: 
1% in 2004 +0.5%/yr; 
to 2% by 2006 
+1.5%/yr; to 5% by 
2008; +1%/yr to 7% 
in 2010 and thereafter 
Class I or II 
technologies: 3% in 
2004 and thereafter 
Class I: solar, wind, landfill gas, 
new (post 7/1/03) run of river hydro 
(<= 5 MW), fuel cells, ocean 
thermal, wave or tidal, low-e RE 
conversion tech., low NOx 
emitting, sustainable biomass 
(Biomass facilities with quarterly 
avg. NOx emission rate <= 0.075 
lbs. per MMBTU. Existing (pre 
7/1/03) biomass facilities <= 500 
kW are exempt from NOx emission 
requirement.) 
Class II: MSW, existing (prior to 
7/1/03) run of river hydro (<= 5 
MW), other biomass (facilities 
must have quarterly avg. NOx 
emission rate <= 0.2 lbs. per 
MMBTU) 
  
 
 156. See Bill Opalka, U.S. Military Leads Green Charge, 
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM, July 29, 1009, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ 
rea/news/article/2009/07/u-s-military-leads-green-charge. 
 157. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THE NATIONAL ENERGY MODELING SYSTEM: AN 
OVERVIEW, REPORT NO. DOE/EIA-0581 (2009), available at http:// 
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/overview. 
 158. STEVEN L. CLEMMER, ET AL., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, A POWERFUL 
OPPORTUNITY: MAKING RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY THE STANDARD (1999). 
 159. Adapted from Ferrey, supra note 139, at 627 tbl.4. 
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Maine 30% of sales in 2000 
(start of competition) 
and thereafter as a 
condition of licensing. 
Fuel cells, tidal power, solar, wind, 
geothermal, hydro, biomass, and 
MSW (under 100 MW) 
High efficiency cogen. systems of 
unlimited size. 
  
Maryland Tier 1 Renewables: 
1% in 2006, 
increasing 1% 
biannually to 7% in 
2018, increasing to 
7.5% in 2019, and 
thereafter 
Tier 1 or 2 
Renewables: 2.5% 
2006-2018 
Tier l: solar, wind, biomass, landfill 
gas, geothermal, ocean, fuel cells 
(renewable sources only), and 
small hydro (< 30 MW) 
Tier 2: hydro, MSW, and 
incineration of poultry litter 
  
Massachusetts 
 
1% of sales from new 
renewables by 2003 
+0.5%/yr. to 4% in 
2009; +1 % per year 
thereafter until date 
determined by 
Division of Energy 
Resources. 
 
Solar, wind, ocean thermal, wave, 
tidal, landfill gas, and low-emission 
advanced biomass beginning 
commercial operation or 
representing increase in capacity at 
existing facility after 12/31/97. 
Hydro and MSW qualify as existing 
and are not eligible. 
>$50/mw
h 
W/in ISO-
NE 
New Jersey 
3 Classes 
Class I or II 
Technologies: 2.5% 
by 2004-2008. 
Class I technologies: 
0.74% in 2004; 
0.983% in 2005; 
2.037% in 2006; 
2.924% in 2007; and 
3.84% in 2008. 
Solar Electric: 0.01% 
in 2004; 0.017% in 
2005; 0.0393% in 
2006; 0.0817% in 
2007; and 0.16% in 
2008. 
NJBPU sets 
Class I: solar, wind, geothermal, 
wave, tidal energy, landfill gas, fuel 
cells, sustainable biomass 
Class II: MSW or hydro (<30 MW) 
that meets high environmental 
standards 
Class I 
$750 
Class II 
$350 
Solar: 
$200 
New 
Jersey 
Maryland 
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requirements for 2009 
and after, but must be 
at or above 2008 
levels (see comments 
regarding proposed 
RES requirements 
through 2020. 
New York New renewable 
energy requirement: 
0.8% in 2006, 
increasing ~0.8%/yr 
to 6.56% in 2013. 
Customer-sited tier is 
2% of total 
annual RES targets. 
With existing baseline 
renewable energy, 
and generation 
expected from state 
purchase 
requirement, 
renewable energy 
increases from 
19.45% in 2003 to 
24% in 2013 (an 
additional 1% is 
expected to come 
from voluntary green 
pricing programs). 
 
Main Tier, wind, solar, ocean, 
biomass, biogas, fuel cells, 
incremental hydro, and low-impact 
run-of-river hydro > 30 MW 
Customer Tier: solar, wind 
(<300kW), fuel cells, and methane 
digesters. 
  
Rhode Island 3% by 2007, 
increasing 0.5%/yr. to 
4.5% in 2010, then 
increasing by 1 %/yr. 
to 8.5% in 2014, then 
increasing by 
1.5%/yr. to 16% in 
2019. 
Requirement remains 
at 16% in 2020 and 
thereafter unless the 
Solar, wind, ocean, geothermal, 
biomass, co-firing, hydro (< 30 
MW), fuel cells using renewable 
resources 
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PUC determines it is 
no longer necessary. 
 
C. The Value of Renewable Energy Credits and Offsets 
The prices of traded RECs have been relatively high in three 
states: Massachusetts, Connecticut (for Class I RECs), and Rhode 
Island.160  REC trading prices in other states have been significantly 
lower; led by New Jersey Class I RECs.161  In most other states, supply 
exceeds the demand for RECs, and the prices have trended at about 
ten percent of those in the three highest states.162 
The price impact of RPS-mandated renewable energy projects 
has been estimated to range between a 0.1% increase in retail rates 
(in Maine, Maryland, New Jersey and New York) and a 1.1% 
increase in Massachusetts.163  In 2005, Massachusetts collected $19.6 
million in alternative compliance payments under its RPS system, and 
nearly $17.8 million in 2006.164  In a 2007 Massachusetts auction, 
RECs sold above the $0.055 per kWh alternative compliance payment 
(ACP) that units must pay if they are deficient in RECs: 396 RECs 
from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy were sold for a price of 
$0.0571 per kWh during the first quarter of 2007, by Evolutions 
Markets, well above the ACP.165  A utility RPS charge of only $0.001 
per kWh would raise almost $4 billion annually if imposed across all 
retailed power in the United States.166 
[There is] significant regulatory uncertainty around RPS programs.  
Either a regulatory change in eligible projects, or court 
interpretation of these programs, can cause great volatility in RECs 
 
 160. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 27 fig.15. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 28. 
 163. Wiser et al., supra note 136, at 16 & fig.4 (forecasting that the cost of this 
implementation would be no more than one percent). 
 164. MASS. 2005 RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 144, at 4; COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., ANNUAL RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT FOR 2006, at 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.mass.gov/Eoeea/docs/doer/rps/rps-2006annual-rpt.pdf [hereinafter 
MASS. 2006 RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT]. 
 165. Press Release, Evolution Markets, Evolutions Markets to Host Renewable Energy 
Certificates Auction for the Massachusetts Maritime Academy (Apr. 17, 2008), 
http://new.evomarkets.com/pdf_documents/Evolution%20Hosts%20REC%20Auction%20for
%20Maritime%20Academy.pdf. 
 166. See Energy Info. Admin., Electricity Explained, 
www.eia.doe.gov/basics/quickelectric.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).  US retail electricity sales 
equaled 3923814000 MWh in 2007.  Id.  
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pricing.  For example, Connecticut Class I resources were originally 
defined to include wind, landfill methane, fuel cell, and solar voltaic 
resources, and REC prices ranged from $35 to $50 per REC with 
this definition.  However, in June 2003, the [l]egislature amended 
the definitions to add certain biomass generation plants located in 
New England as Class I resources if they reduced NOx emissions. 
The Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control made an 
advisory ruling that an existing biomass plant located in Maine 
“retooled” to meet a lower NOx emission standard would qualify 
for Class I Connecticut RECs.  The market for Class I RECs came 
crashing down, dropping the forward price for 2006 RECs by 
approximately 90%, from near $35 per [MWh] to near $2.50 per 
[MWh].  Prices later jumped back to near $30 to $50 per REC.167 
Massachusetts, in contrast, tightened the eligibility requirements 
for biomass facilities.  The Massachusetts Department of Energy 
Resources replaced guidelines that allowed retrofitted biomass 
facilities to qualify under the RPS with a policy statement that 
specifically excluded such facilities from eligibility.168  The new policy 
statement ultimately protected the Massachusetts REC price, which 
hovered at the level of the ACP.169 
One-third of sales of “green” electricity are actually the purchase 
of RECs, rather than the purchase by a consumer of generated 
renewable energy.170  In other words, rather than actually purchase 
the energy output of a renewable generator through a bilateral 
contract, buyers purchase just the state-created REC, rather than the 
energy itself.  This purchases the virtual representation of the 
renewable energy, if not the energy itself.  Seventy-seven percent of 
the green power sales were sold to non-residential customers.171  In 
other words, businesses, rather than individual households, have 
purchased the great majority of renewable attributes of power 
generation. This evidences that commercial and institutional entities, 
 
 167. Ferrey, supra note 139, at 631–32. 
 168. MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., GUIDELINE ON THE MA RPS ELIGIBILITY OF 
GENERATION UNITS THAT RE-TOOL WITH LOW EMISSION, ADVANCED BIOMASS 
TECHNOLOGIES (2004), available at http://www.mass.gov/Eoeea/docs/doer/rps/g-lebio.pdf; 
MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., POLICY STATEMENT OF RPS ELIGIBILITY OF RETOOLED 
BIOMASS PLANTS (2005), available at http://mass.gov/doer/rps/rps-pol-stat-elig-biomass.pdf; 
MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., NOTICE OF INQUIRY REGARDING SOME PROPOSED REVISIONS 
OF THE REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO THE DEFINITION OF "LOW-EMISSION, ADVANCED 
BIOMASS POWER CONVERSION TECHNOLOGIES" (2005), available at http://mass.gov/ 
doer/rps/rps_notice_of_inquiry.pdf [hereinafter NOTICE OF INQUIRY]. 
 169. NOTICE OF INQUIRY, supra note 168. 
 170. LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., GREEN POWER MARKETING IN 
THE UNITED STATES: A STATUS REPORT 4 (2008). 
 171. Id. 
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rather than ordinary residential consumers, are the mainstay of green 
electricity purchasers. 
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF STATE RPS PROGRAMS 
A. Location of Renewable Resources: A Constitutional Issue 
States regard the geographic location where RECs are created 
differently: 
 At least three states expressly require that the RECs be 
created by in-state power generation, and two additional 
states require that RECs be created either in-state or in 
the service territory of a state utility—this raises some 
dormant commerce clause issues.172 
 Some states require an in-state transmission 
interconnection to count an out-of-state REC.173 
 Several states require that a REC actually be associated 
with energy that is, or could be, by virtue of contracted 
transmission capability, delivered in-state.174 
 Some states allow a wider trading area within an 
Independent System Operator (ISO) or similar electric 
transmission system region.175 
 Some states encourage, but do not require, RECs to be 
traded in-state by attaching a multiplier value to in-state 
RECs.176 
 Distributed generation typically must be located in-state 
to qualify to create RECs.177 
Such state RPS eligibility rules regarding RECs may limit eligible 
projects geographically.  Some states attempt to limit projects to those 
constructed within the state or require direct interconnection to the 
state or state-connected regional grid, essentially to allow the moving 
 
 172. Iowa, the XCEL requirement in Minnesota, and Hawaii are examples of this.  CORY & 
SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 8. 
 173. Arizona and Texas are examples of this.  CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 8 tbl.2. 
 174. Arizona, California, Wisconsin, Minnesota, New Mexico, and New York are examples 
of this.  Delivery can be required on a real-time, a monthly, or a yearly basis. Id. 
 175. California, the New England states, Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania are 
examples of this, as are multi-jurisdictional utilities.  In this case, unbundled RECs can trade 
apart from the actual energy trade. Id. 
 176. Colorado, Delaware, and Arizona have attached in-state multipliers to RECs created in 
the state. Id. at 12 tbl.3. 
 177. Requirements to create RECs in a state raise dormant commerce clause issues and 
multipliers can raise similar concerns. Id. at 9. 
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conductor electrons initiated outside the state to travel into the state.  
Colorado, Illinois, and North Carolina give preference to in-state 
projects.178  Hawaii and Iowa require RPS generation to be in-state or 
from the service territory of an in-state utility.179  California’s 
amendments to its RPS law in 2006 for the first time in a decade 
allowed new out-of-state generation to be counted toward RPS 
requirements of load-serving entities in the state, removing 
constitutional issues.180  Eight states require that the power eligible for 
RPS RECs must be delivered to in-state load-serving entities.181 
Geographic program restrictions raise commerce clause concerns 
under the Constitution.182  A number of states prohibit REC credits 
for out-of-state or out-of-region generation facilities.183  For example, 
New England requires that a REC producer make arrangements on 
an hourly basis to actually deliver the power to the New England 
region.184  New York has a similar system.185  Rhode Island has 
approved RPS credits for a project located in New York State,186 as 
have other states. 
The NEPOOL GIS tracking system will only track those 
resources for RPS credit where out-of-region projects have obtained 
“firm transmission” into the region of power equal to or exceeding 
the generation from an eligible RPS renewable facility.187  The 
NEPOOL system is dispatched on an hourly-forward basis.188  This 
does not mean that the exact electrons moved by renewable energy 
must enter the NEPOOL system.  However, enough transmission 
capacity must be under contract to carry the output of those 
renewable resources into the NEPOOL region in order to create 
credits in a New England state with an RPS program. 189 
 
 178. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 10. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See S.B. 107, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess, (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
portfolio/documents/sb_107_bill_20060926_chaptered.pdf. 
 181. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 10. 
 182. FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS (4th ed. 2007). 
 183. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 9 tbl.2. 
 184. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 8. 
 185. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 10 tbl.3. 
 186. STATE OF R.I. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, RHODE ISLAND RENEWABLE ENERGY 
RESOURCES ELIGIBILITY APPLICATIONS (2008), http://www.ripuc.org/utilityinfo/RES-
Applications-Status(6-21-08).pdf. 
 187. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 8. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Re Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard – Delivery Requirements for Imports, 250 
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 80 (N.Y. Pub. Servs. Comm’n June 28, 2006). 
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Other systems, such as the PJM GATS system, provide a more 
flexible REC accounting scheme.  For the PJM region, this system 
only requires monthly matching of power from eligible renewable 
sources out of state to transmission capacity into the region in order 
to qualify for a REC.190  This longer averaging period is much more 
accommodating than an hourly matching period of out-of-state RECs 
in the PJM region, which may or may not be physically moved into 
the state (but for accounting purposes can show that it could have 
been moved into the state) over committed transmission capacity. 
The PJM interconnect now controls thirteen Mid-Atlantic states 
and the District of Columbia’s transmission decisions.191  One can only 
trade RPS credits inside the PJM member states if one is physically 
located within the PJM geographic boundary.  Certain member 
states—such as Delaware, Maryland and the District of Columbia— 
propose additional requirements of actual transmission into the 
system for eligibility.192  Generators in the New York ISO can trade 
RECs into Massachusetts, but generators in the PJM control area 
cannot trade credits into New York.193 
Yet power does move across state borders, and as only “paper” 
creations, RECs move to be registered in the state where they can be 
traded for the highest value for the generator/trader. Certain high-
value REC states have experienced a proliferation of participating 
RECs-creating facilities registering and trading RECs from outside 
the state.  Massachusetts has traded its general RECs at the highest 
value.  A 2008 report by the Massachusetts Department of Energy 
Resources calculated that the number of plants providing RECs to 
Massachusetts in 2004 was only nineteen; by 2007 this number had 
risen to fifty-three plants.194  The largest supply of Massachusetts 
RECs, about thirty-nine percent, came from predominantly biomass 
facilities in Maine, with other New England states providing 
 
 190. Re Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard: Order Authorizing Additional Main Tier 
Solicitations and Directing Program Modifications, Case No. 0e-E-0188, 2006 WL 191959 (N.Y. 
Pub. Servs. Comm’n Jan. 26, 2006). 
 191. See PJM Interconnection, PJM Territory Served, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/how-
we-operate/territory-served.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2009); see also PJM Interconnection, 
Re:new: PJM 2008 Annual Report 31 (2008), available at http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-
we-are/~/media/about-pjm/newsroom/2008-annual-report.ashx. 
 192. Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 113, at 51. 
 193. Id. at 52; see also Christopher B. Berendt, A State-Based Approach to Building a Liquid 
National Market for Renewable Energy Certificates: The REC-EX Model, ELECTRICITY J., June 
2006, at 54. 
 194. Lisa Wood, Massachusetts' REC Supply Now Equals Demand, A Sharp Reversal from 
Recent Years, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Feb. 25, 2008, at 10. 
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seventeen percent of RECs and New York and Quebec accounting 
for twenty percent.  This left only about one-quarter of Massachusetts 
RECs originating in Massachusetts.195 
In 2007, the Massachusetts penalty rate for not having sufficient 
RECs was $57.12 per REC.196  Massachusetts had a seventy percent 
RPS compliance rate in 2006, sixty-two percent in 2005, and fifty-nine 
percent in 2004.197  In 2006, retailers paid $17.8 million in compliance 
penalties to the state because they did not have sufficient RECs.198 
B. Legal Ownership of Traditional RECs 
The FERC rule on ownership of RECs has sown much 
confusion.  Essentially, it leaves to states the determination of who 
owns newly created, and in some cases previous QF-vintage, RECs.  
Where ownership of RECs is allocated by contract, the contract 
controls.  However, most older QF power sale contracts were silent 
on this issue.199 
FERC held that “contracts for the sale of QF capacity and 
energy entered into pursuant to PURPA do not convey RECs to the 
purchasing utility (absent express provision in a contract to the 
contrary) . . . .  [A] state may decide that a sale of power at wholesale 
automatically transfers ownership of the state-created RECs.”200  An 
April 2004 order denying rehearing restated the position taken in the 
original order.201 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., ANNUAL RPS COMPLIANCE 
REPORT FOR 2007, at 6 (2008), available at http://www.mass.gov/Eoeea/docs/doer/rps/rps-
2007annual-rpt.pdf [hereinafter MASS. 2007 RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT]. 
 197. MASS. 2006 RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 164, at 14. 
 198. Id. at 4. 
 199. An exception was early contracts negotiated for QF power purchase by certain of the 
New England utilities, which assigned all future credits related to air emissions to the utility 
purchase.  At the time, no such credits may have existed.  See, e.g., Qualifying Facility contracts 
executed by subsidiaries of the New England Electric System and its operating subsidiaries.  
These contracts were assigned to the buyers of the generation assets of this electric system. 
 200. Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 531 F.3d 183 (2nd Cir. 
2008) (quoting Am. Ref-Fuel Co., 105 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,004 (2003)). 
 201. Am. Ref-Fuel Co.,107 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,016 (2004) (Thirteen other QFs, industry 
associations, municipalities and others intervened in support of the petition.  The Maine PUC, 
and a group of eighteen other state utility commissions and utility purchasers of renewable QF 
energy under PURPA contracts, intervened in opposition to the QFs’ petition.  Another sixteen 
parties intervened either with no position or in an untimely manner.  While distribution utilities 
that purchased QF power later claimed that they also implicitly owned future-created RECs, 
they are arguing that impliedly they bought all later-created and non-negotiated attributes of 
power generation.  However, utilities have not claimed any ownership or responsibility for other 
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FERC has delegated authority to states to determine ownership 
of traditional RECs.  The state rulings are split.  Some states have 
granted the RECs to utilities in transactions that do not specifically 
address ownership of the RECs. 
Sixteen states have adopted some legal position, the majority of 
which have assigned vintage RECs under silent QF contracts to utility 
purchasers of power.202  Two of the states have determined that QFs 
must be compensated financially for relinquishing title to these 
vintage RECs.203 Almost half of the states with new contracts have 
allowed RECs to be retained by the QF where the contract is silent.  
As a generalization, vintage QF RECs, where the contract is silent, 
are vested with the utility purchaser of power, while new contracts, 
where silent, retain the RECs with the power generator and seller.204  
In the great majority of states that require utilities to net meter power 
to on-site generators, where REC ownership is not explicitly 
addressed, RECs are allowed to be retained by the net-meter 
generator.205 
Most states that provide additional cash or other subsidies to 
renewable generators typically do not address whether any transfer of 
RECs occurs in return for the funding.206  However, two states require 
that, in return for funding, any RECs created are conveyed to the 
entity supplying the funding.207  There does not appear to be a 
convincing legal rationale as to why exported net metered power 
generation is treated in one manner regarding RECs and stand-alone 
QF or otherwise eligible power generation is treated differently. 
 
attributes of power generation such as emission of criteria or toxic pollutants from non-utility 
generators with whom they contract for power.  They have not claimed any responsibility for 
purchasing offsets for NOx or SO2, not have they claimed ownership of environmental residues 
such as bottom ash, fly ash, or other chemicals that are attributes of the generation of 
electricity.). 
 202. ED HOLT ET AL., WHO OWNS RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES?  AN 
EXPLORATION OF POLICY OPTIONS AND PRACTICE, REPORT NO. LBNL-59965, at xiv tbl.ES-2 
(2006), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/59965.pdf. 
 203. Id. at 43. 
 204. See id. at xiii. 
 205. Id. at xiv.  Of the first 12 states to address the issue in the context of net metering, six 
states allowed the generator to retain all RECs, three states allowed the RECS from on-site use 
of power to be retained by the generator and the RECs associated with exported excess net 
power to be vested with the utility (although two of these three required compensation to the 
customer for that title transfer), while one state divided the RECs between the two parties. Id. 
at xv tbl.ES-3. 
 206. Id. at xv. 
 207. Id. at xvi tbl.ES-4. 
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The Maine PUC concluded that RECs were “a fundamental 
part” of legacy PURPA contracts and that the transactions 
thereunder “were, in effect, a bundled sale of energy and attributes 
that at the time represented a single product.”208  On February 14, 
2003, the Maine PUC created an explicit exception that “allow[s] 
purchasers of the QF entitlements, who do not receive associated GIS 
certificates, to use the entitlements.”209  This decision created the 
possibility of double counting, which the Maine PUC 
acknowledged.210 
Pennsylvania’s Board of Public Utilities determined that the 
ownership of RECs belongs to the purchaser. 211  In two separate 
rulings, Minnesota Methane (involving landfill gas (LFG) produced at 
the Harford Landfill),212 and Wheelabrator (regarding a resource 
recovery project),213, the Connecticut Department of Public Utility 
Control (DPUC) vested ownership of RECs in the utility, citing the 
FERC American Ref-Fuel decision.214 
The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the 
Connecticut DPUC regarding ownership of RECs associated with 
pre-existing QFs entitled to sell power to utilities under PURPA.215  
In two cases decided on the same day, the Court held that long-term 
QF PURPA power sale contracts, executed prior to the existence of 
the Connecticut REC program, did not entitle the QF to retain the 
RECs.216  Since, had the QFs not utilized renewable resources, the 
 
 208. Investigation of GIS Certificates Associated with Qualifying Facility Agreements, 
Docket No. 2002-506, 2002 Me. PUC LEXIS 331 at *8 (Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 6, 2002). 
 209. Amendments to Information Disclosure Rule, Docket No. 2002-580, 2003 Me. PUC 
LEXIS 75 at *9 (Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Feb. 14, 2003). 
 210. Id. at *32. 
 211. Petition for a Declaratory Order Regarding the Ownership of Alternative Energy 
Credits and any Environmental Attributes Associated with Non-Utility Generation Facilities 
under Contract to Pennsylvania Electric Company and Metropolitan Edison Company, Docket 
No. P-00052149, 35 Pa. Bull. 2041, 2044–45 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n Apr. 2, 2005). 
 212. Application of Minnesota Methane, LLC Regarding the Sale of Electricity Generated 
at the Hartford Landfill to the Connecticut Light and Power Company, Docket No. 96-07-
21RE01, 2004 Conn. PUC LEXIS 39 (Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control Mar. 19, 2004). 
 213. Petition of the Riley Energy Corporation for Contract Approval and Declaratory 
Rulings Regarding the Lisbon Resources Recovery Project – Generation Information System 
Certificates, Docket No. 91-01-12RE01, 2004 Conn. PUC LEXIS 148 (Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. 
Control Dec. 6, 2004). 
 214. Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 531 F.3d 183, 184 (2nd 
Cir. 2008). 
 215. Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 931 A.2d 159 (Conn. 2007); 
Minnesota Methane, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 931 A.2d 177 (Conn. 2007). 
 216. Wheelabrator Lisbon, 531 F.3d at 184. 
Ferrey_final_cpcxns.doc 2/22/2010  9:33:43 AM 
164 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM Vol. 20:125 
utility would have sidestepped paying the full avoided power 
purchase price, the utility was entitled to the RECs, because to do 
otherwise, the Court reasoned, would provide a windfall to the power 
generators at the expense of utility ratepayers.217 
Other states have taken a pro-generator position.  California 
acted by legislation. In 2006, California Senate Bill 107 provided that 
any sale of renewable power prior to 2005 included no RECs unless 
the buyer of power explicitly purchased those RECs by contract.218  
Therefore, the legislature deemed that parties purchasing most 
vintage renewable power sale and QF contracts in California would 
not benefit from future state-created RECs, even though the 
contracting parties would have entered the contract on similar terms 
notwithstanding this fact.  Indeed, under PURPA, the utility 
purchaser of power would have been required to enter this contract 
on these terms.219 
In an unusual path to a decision, the Idaho PUC declined to rule 
in two matters, 220 thereby avoiding leaving RECs with the project 
owners, concluding that Idaho had no “state-created RECs” as 
described in FERC’s American-Ref decision.221  The staff of the Idaho 
PUC stated that if it did have the authority to rule, it would leave 
ownership of the RECs with QF power generators.222 
C. Forecast of RPS Capabilities 
 As noted earlier, it is estimated that forty-five percent of the 
4300 MW of wind power installed in the United States between 2001 
and 2004 was motivated by state renewable portfolio standards, while 
an additional fifteen percent of these installations were motivated by 
state renewable energy trust funds and subsidies.223  Some analysts 
have concluded that the portfolio standard will be more influential in 
 
 217. Id. at 185. 
 218. S.B. 107, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess, (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
portfolio/documents/sb_107_bill_20060926_chaptered.pdf. 
 219. 16 U.S.C. § 824a (2006). 
 220. In the Matter of the Application of Idaho Power Company for Approval of an 
Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Electric Energy Between Idaho Power Company and the 
J.R. Simplot Company, Case No. IPC-E-04-16, Order No. 29577, 2004 Ida. PUC LEXIS 167 
(Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 3, 2004); In the Matter of a Petition Filed by Idaho Power 
Company for an Order Determining Ownership of the Environmental Attributes Associated 
with a Qualifying Facility Upon Purchase by a Utility of the Energy Produced by a Qualifying 
Facility, Case No. IPC-E-04-2, Order No. 29480, 2004 Ida. PUC LEXIS 76 (Idaho Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n Apr. 27, 2004). 
 221. Am. Ref-Fuel Co., 107 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,016 (2003). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Wiser & Bolinger, supra note 127, at 48. 
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promoting renewable power development than the system benefit 
charge or trust fund.224   
It is estimated that roughly half of new renewable energy power 
capacity in the United States over the last decade has [occurred] in 
states with RPS programs in place [ which constitute about 40% of 
the states].  Over 90% of these capacity additions have come from 
wind power, with biomass and geothermal resources in second and 
third position . . . .  The National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
has estimated that RPS programs may result in only 8 to 12 GW of 
new wind capacity (about 1% of U.S. installed total capacity) 
relative to a base case where no RPS programs existed. Therefore, 
the total contribution of RPS programs appears modest in terms of 
total U.S. power resources.225 
This may be because portfolio standards allow market forces to 
work; developers will develop the most cost-effective and reliable 
renewable technologies eligible under a state program.  SBCs, on the 
other hand, may be directed at experimental, politically favored or 
less cost-effective projects.  The total expected renewable capacity 
added by RPSs and SBCs in those states that have adopted them will 
be dwarfed, making up less than ten percent of the total expected 
increases in U.S. electric system non-renewable capacity during the 
first decade of the new century, and will be less than 1% of total 
United States electric capacity.226 
Nonetheless, in a number of states, including Massachusetts, 
Nevada, Arizona, New York and California, new renewable energy 
project developments are not currently on track to meet mandatory 
RPS targets for renewable generation as a percentage of total retail 
load.227  In some states, there are extensive exemptions from the RPS 
purchase mandate or excuses for retailers not to obtain otherwise 
required RECs along the lines of force majeure have been developed. 
228  In several states regulatory commissions retain broad discretion to 
 
 224. Ryan Wiser et al., Emerging Markets for Renewable Energy: The Role of State Policies 
During Restructuring, ELECTRICITY J., Jan./Feb. 2000, at 13, 19 (concluding that renewable 
portfolio standards in eight states will be more influential than system benefit charges/trust 
funds in 12 states in driving the overall renewable energy market between 2000 and 2010).  
Texas is predicted to provide the most substantial domestic market for new renewable 
generation, at 2,000 MW.  California, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Jersey are projected 
to add 400 to 600 MW each, while the remaining states are expected to add less.  These authors 
expect the total from renewable portfolio standards and system benefit charges/trust funds to 
exceed that driven by green power marketing efforts, alone.  Id. at 20. 
 225. Ferrey, supra note 139, at 623. 
 226. Id. at 20. 
 227. Ryan Wiser et al., supra note 136, at 13. 
 228. Id. at 12. 
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grant waivers to regulated entities that do not comply with state RPS 
requirements.229  Very open-ended waiver or excuse provisions exist 
in the RPS programs in Arizona,230 Hawaii,231 Minnesota,232 and 
Pennsylvania.233 
In some states, such as Massachusetts, where RECs have traded 
in excess of $50 per MWh, RECs have been sold for as much as the 
value of the power generated.234  In such situations, the forward-
monetized value of RECs is a critical component of renewable energy 
financing.235  However, unless there is the ability to monetize these 
credits through long-term contracts or some variety of credit support 
mechanisms, the forward value of this revenue stream may not be 
translatable into project financing.  REC prices under long-term 
contracts are significantly lower (closer to the $25 range) than the 
short-term spot market prices, which hover around the ACP rate.236 
Ambiguity in definitions allowed the Connecticut DPUC to 
exempt two of the state’s largest utilities from state RPS obligations.237  
Other states, such as Massachusetts, require regulated utilities to sign 
long-term power purchase contracts with renewable energy projects 
that qualify to produce RECs.238  Nevada has established a fund to 
guarantee utility power purchase contracts that would cover RECs 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. In the Matter of the Proposed Rulemaking for the Renewable Energy Standard and 
Tariff Rules, Docket No. RE-00C-05-0030, Decision No. 68566 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n March 14, 
2006), available at http://www.cc.state.az.us/divisions/utilities/electric/RES-03-14-06.pdf. 
 231. H.B. 173 CD1, 21st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2001). 
 232. S.F. 0004, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007). 
 233. S.B. 1030, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004). 
 234. Some RECs in Massachusetts have sold for above $50/Mwh, which is close to the ACP 
which has increased with cost of living from $50/Mwh.  See MASS. 2007 RPS COMPLIANCE 
REPORT, supra note 196.   In 2007, RECs in Massachusetts sold for approximately $50/Mwh.  
See Housley Carr, Florida PSC to Weigh Delaying Rate Cases Until New Members are Seated, 
ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Oct. 26, 2009, at 32.  The wholesale trading price of power in the 
ISO-NE market during 2009 has been approximately $40/Mwh.   See ISO New England, 
www.ISO-NE.com (last visited Dec. 26, 2009). 
 235. Where the value of the REC is approximately equal to the value of power sold, this 
doubles the revenue stream earned by the generator of this power.  This is significant in project 
development.  LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., GREEN POWER 
MARKETING IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATUS REPORT (2009). 
 236. The recently offered NSTAR (NSTAR is the Investor Owned Utility which serves the 
greater Boston area) Green REC program resells RECs from the Maple Ridge Wind Farm in 
Upstate New York for ~1.4 cents per kWh.  See NSTAR.com, NSTAR Green Customer 
Information, http://www.nstar.com/residential/customer_information/nstar_green/nstar_green 
.asp (last visited Dec. 26, 2009). 
 237. Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 113, at 51. 
 238. 220 Mass. Code Regs. 17.00 (2009). 
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purchases.239  Massachusetts utilizes its renewable trust fund to offer 
various types of credit support for future RECs of eligible projects at 
the development stage.240 
All of these incentives, particularly [s]tate RPS standards have 
failed to substantially increase the deployment of renewable energy 
technologies on a national scale.  Non-hydroelectric renewable 
energy resources continue to hover around 2% of the U.S. 
electricity supply.  Therefore, while various renewable technologies 
are projected to double or triple their gross amount of power 
contribution, this is not projected to have a significant impact for 
two reasons.  First, these renewable technologies are starting from a 
very small base, so that even a large percentage increase translates 
to a relatively small absolute increase.  Second, electricity demand 
in the United States is increasing, so the contribution of any given 
project is a progressively smaller percentage of the increasing 
generation base.241 
Even if states effectively implemented all of their existing RPS 
mandates, emissions would be reduced by between 1% and 1.5% 
from business-as-usual scenarios by 2015 to 2020.242 
Non-hydroelectric renewable energy deployment is expected to rise 
from about 2% to [only 3% by 2015 and] 4% by 2030.  Fossil-fired 
energy resources are projected to maintain a roughly 70% share of 
total electric generation in the United States and an 86% share of 
total U.S. primary energy supply (including the transportation 
sector) in 2030.  Therefore, a radical departure is not projected by 
the U.S. government between [2005] and 2030 in fossil fuel use.243 
Many of the REC obligations are short-term, and therefore are 
not supporting long-term financing of eligible renewable resources 
that would satisfy the RECs mandate.  So, the forecast is that the RPS 
 
 239. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 21. 
 240. The Massachusetts Technology Collaborative (MTC) initiated two rounds of financing 
called the Green Power Partnership (MGPP).  The program is currently closed.  The MGPP 
aimed to address the lack of REC cash-flow certainty by providing long term REC contracts to 
developers.  Under the program MTC would assume some of the risk associated with 
government mandated demand and the volatility of voluntary markets for RECs by signing 
REC purchase agreement contracts with developers.  MTC then sells the RECs on the open 
market.  The MTC places funds from REC sales into an escrow account providing to the 
developer the creditworthiness required by equity and debt investors.  Three types of REC 
contracts were offered: Purchase Agreements, Put-Options, and Price-Collars.  Funded projects 
included wind, hydro, landfill gas, solar pv, and biomass.  Mass. Tech. Collaborative Renewable 
Energy Trust, Massachusetts Green Power Partnership, http://www.masstech.org/ 
renewableenergy/mgpp.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2009). 
 241. Ferrey, supra note 139, at 632–33. 
 242. Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and 
Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does this Say About Federalism and 
Environmental Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1026 (2006). 
 243. Ferrey, supra note 139, at 633. 
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system is not meeting its targets in several states, and is not expected, 
alone, to meet the renewable power goals that it embodies. 
There is an obvious connection between RPS renewable power 
programs and goals for carbon reduction strategies.  “That RPS 
mandates are primarily carbon reduction mandates seems relatively 
clear . . . .  [T]his seems to be their primary perceived benefit.”244  
However, a criticism of an RPS system is that much more cost-
effective carbon reductions would be achieved by a carbon cap-and-
trade system, resulting in greater reductions at one-third the cost per 
ton of carbon saved. 245  In other words, renewable power generation 
may not be the low-hanging fruit, as is energy conservation, for the 
least expensive carbon reduction.246 
RPS renewable power requirements also are not necessarily seen 
as additional carbon reductions, as they are assumed to become a 
component of the overall carbon cap achievement.247  A cap-and-trade 
carbon reduction program does not guarantee that any renewables 
will be constructed.  However, long-term, electric power is the 
essential sector for carbon reduction and investments in power 
generation are long-term infrastructure realities.248  As opposed to an 
RPS system, some countries in Europe and elsewhere instead 
promote renewable generation with feed-in tariffs outside of the 
carbon reduction or cap programs. 
Assuming that full compliance is achieved, current mandatory 
state RPS policies, in just those states that have them, will require the 
addition of roughly 60 GW of new renewable energy capacity by 
2025,249 an amount equivalent to 4.7% of projected 2025 electricity 
generation in the United States and fifteen percent of projected 
electricity demand growth.250  It is not thought to be practically 
achievable to have the various RPS projects around the country 
install the required additional 60 GW of new generation.251  The 
congested and limited state of transmission infrastructure to move 
renewable power from generation site to market causes some to state 
 
 244. Neal J. Cabral, The Role of Renewable Portfolio Standards in the Context of a National 
Carbon Cap-and-Trade Program, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 13, 13 (2007-08). 
 245. Id. at 14 (quoting conclusions of Australian government study). 
 246. Id. at 15. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Quin Shea, Let's Keep Timetables Realistic in Moving Toward a Low-Carbon Electricity 
Future, ELECTRICITY J., April 2008, at 80. 
 249. Wiser & Barbose, supra note 106, at 1. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Tiernan, supra note 147, at 7. 
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that these requirements cannot be achieved within specified time 
frames.252 
Therefore, with the underachievement of tax incentives, state 
subsidy programs, and state RPS requirements, thought has recently 
turned to a third alternative, feed-in tariffs for renewable power 
development.  Feed-in tariffs have been used by various foreign 
countries and are being considered by several U.S. states.  As 
additional states experiment with European-type feed-in tariffs, 
discussed below, it becomes crucially important to understand the 
legal implications and legality of a feed-in tariff model implemented 
in the United States at the state level. 
However, this option may not be legal under U.S. constitutional 
law. 
VI. FEED-IN TARIFFS AS THE ALTERNATIVE RENEWABLE POWER 
MECHANISM 
A. Feed- in Tariffs Internationally 
Feed-in tariffs are the most widely employed renewable energy 
policy in Europe and, increasingly, the rest of the world.253  As of 
2006, seventeen European Union countries, as well as Brazil, 
Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Nicaragua, Norway, Sri Lanka, 
Switzerland and Turkey all used feed-in tariffs to promote and 
support renewable energy.254  In March of 2008, the Kenyan Ministry 
of Energy proposed the adoption of feed-in tariffs for wind, biomass 
and small-hydro resources.255 
A feed-in tariff establishes a secure contract for wholesale 
electricity at a set price that results in a rate of return attractive to 
investors and developers.256  Feed-in tariff structures are typically 
either fixed payments based on an electricity generator’s cost to 
produce electricity, or as a fixed premium paid above the spot market 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. WILSON RICKERSON & ROBERT C. GRACE, THE HEINRICH BOLL FOUND., THE 
DEBATE OVER FIXED PRICE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY IN EUROPE AND THE 
UNITED STATES: FALLOUT AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 1 (2007). 
 254. Id. 
 255. See KENYAN MINISTRY OF ENERGY, FEED-IN-TARIFFS POLICY FOR WIND, BIOMASS 
AND SMALL HYDRO RESOURCE GENERATED ELECTRICITY (2008), available at http:// 
www.investmentkenya.com/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=&task=doc_download&gi
d=20. 
 256. See Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs to Meet U.S. 
Renewable Electricity Targets, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 73–74. 
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or wholesale market price of electricity.257  These fixed payments are 
long-term contracts for anywhere from five to thirty years in 
duration.258 
Feed-in tariffs increase the price of certain renewable 
technologies to an amount that is deemed administratively and 
politically necessary to encourage their development.  Feed-in tariffs 
typically may exceed utility-avoided costs, and therefore are justified 
only by their objectives and results, and not typically by accepted 
ratemaking methodology, which aims to minimize prudent generating 
costs.259  Often fixed-payment feed-in rates and terms are 
differentiated by technology and are based on the cost of deploying a 
given renewable energy technology.260  Feed-in tariffs for sale of 
renewable power typically decline over time as the high front-end 
capital costs of renewable energy are amortized and as the number of 
installed systems increases.261  Feed-in tariff laws usually also 
guarantee interconnection for distributed generation and utility scale 
projects.262  Feed-in tariffs have been successful in encouraging 
significant renewable energy development in nearly all of the 
countries in which they have been deployed.263 
The high initial capital costs of permitting and construction can 
hinder the development of renewable technologies, while feed-in 
tariff price premiums can help to offset the risk associated with those 
high capital costs.264  Feed-in tariffs offer a fixed price long term 
contract for payment from utility or electricity suppliers to the 
wholesale renewable energy generator.265  The structure of a feed-in 
 
 257. Id. at 73. 
 258. ANNE HELD ET AL, FEED-IN SYSTEMS IN GERMANY, SPAIN AND SLOVENIA: A 
COMPARISON (2007), available at http://www.feed-in-
cooperation.org/wDefault_7/wDefault_7/download-files/research/ific_comparison_of_fit-
systems_de_es_sl.pdf?WSESSIONID=a8b71b3dc0adcd1b2333c8fd143f5a36. 
 259. FERREY, supra note 17, § 5:9. 
 260. JANET L. SAWIN, NATIONAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS: POLICY LESSONS FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT & DIFFUSION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES AROUND THE 
WORLD 5 (2004), available at http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ 
Miguel/Sawin__2004__National_policy_instruments.pdf. 
 261. See id. 
 262. John Farrell, Feed in Tariffs in America: Driving the Economy with Renewable Energy 
Policy That Works 6 (2009), available at http://www.boell.de/downloads/ 
ecology/FIT_in_America_web.pdf (noting that under European feed-in tariffs, governments 
“further require utilities to interconnect renewable energy projects on demand”). 
 263. HELD ET AL., supra note 258, at 4. 
 264. Jonathan A. Lesser & Xuejuan Su, Design of an Economically Efficient Feed-in Tariff 
Structure for Renewable Energy Development, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 981(2008). 
 265. See Sawin, supra note 260, at 4. 
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tariff can be either a long term payment based on the cost of 
generation—including profit—or a premium added on to the 
wholesale or spot-market price of electricity.  So long as a generator 
feeds power onto the grid, it is guaranteed a long-term contract at the 
government mandated feed-in price for the renewable energy 
commodity.  A feed-in tariff also can be structured to reflect the 
benefits that renewable energy sources provide that are not reflected 
in traditional fossil fuel resource-based pricing structures, including 
pollution costs, climate change costs, security costs, and future fossil 
fuel cost-uncertainty.266 
Costs of a feed-in tariff are passed on to consumers by 
purchasing energy suppliers and reflect a public policy decision to 
increase the percentage of renewable electricity sources in use. There 
are myriad reasons to increase the percentage of renewable energy in 
a supply portfolio, including diversified domestic energy security, 
greater energy independence from imported supplies, local job and 
technology growth, reduction in pollution, and reduction of 
environmental damage from fossil fuel-generated electricity.267  The 
European experience justifies feed-in tariffs as a cost-effective 
technique, which promotes innovation and a healthy investment 
environment for renewable energy technologies.268 
Germany, Denmark, and Spain, while only a small fraction of the 
size of the United States in square miles, were responsible for fifty-
three percent of total installed global wind power capacity between 
1990 and 2005.269  Denmark receives nearly 20% of its energy from 
wind power; Germany receives 5% of its energy from wind power and 
will meet its goal of 12.5% renewable electricity by 2009, a year 
earlier than expected.270  Germany’s feed-in tariff program has created 
one of the world’s largest solar energy markets, and Spain is close 
behind.271  The policy experience in Europe has also found feed-in 
tariffs to be less risky, less costly, and more efficient than other types 
of renewable incentives, such as RPSs or other minimum percentage 
requirements.272  These benefits have in turn led to increases in 
 
 266. See RICKERSON & GRACE, supra note 253. 
 267. ALAN NOGEE ET AL., POWERFUL SOLUTIONS: 7 WAYS TO SWITCH AMERICA TO 
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY 4–12 (1999). 
 268. See id.; see also Pablo del Rio &Miguel Gual, An Integrated Assessment of the Feed-in 
Tariff System in Spain, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 994 (2007). 
 269. RICKERSON & GRACE, supra note 253, at 9. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 10. 
 272. Id. at 11; see also Lesser & Su, supra note 264. 
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domestic production and manufacturing of renewable technologies 
and the creation of jobs in the renewable energy sector.  For example, 
Germany created 235,600 jobs in the renewable energy sector in 2006, 
a fifty percent increase from 2004.273  The solar energy market in 
Germany has increased rapidly.274 
The European debate on renewable energy incentives has 
considered both feed-in tariff policies and RPSs.  According to 
Rickerson and Grace, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
initially favored RPSs, while Germany, Spain, and other countries 
favored feed-in tariffs.275  Consequently, Germany has 200 times the 
installed solar capacity and ten times the number of renewable energy 
jobs created as the U.K.276  In Germany, the current debate is whether 
the expense of feed-in tariffs is too high compared to what the public 
is willing to support.277  The average German electric bill has 
increased by roughly $3 per month ( 1.45/month)278 over the period of 
feed-in tariff implementation.279  The German public has generally 
supported the increase, especially since many individuals have taken 
advantage of the incentives to install their own renewable energy 
generation systems.280  Overall, renewable energy installations saved 
114 million tons of CO2 in Germany in 2007.
281 
For the renewable energy developer, the feed-in tariff decreases 
investment risk by guaranteeing an investor or developer a long-term 
contract at a secured price with a return on investment of eight to 
nine percent.282  By contrast, RPS policies require developers and 
 
 273. Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturchutz und Raktorsicherheit, Renewable 
Energies Already Providing 236,000 Jobs in Germany in 2006 (Sept. 2007), 
http://www.bmu.de/english/renewable_energy/downloads/doc/40338.php. 
 274. Mark Landler, Germany Debates Subsidies for Solar Industries, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 
2008, at C1. 
 275. See RICKERSON & GRACE, supra note 253, at 5, 8. 
 276. Ashley Seager, Green Power: Germany Sets Shining Example in Providing a Harvest 
for the World: Thanks to Tariff Guarantees, Germany Has 200 Times as Much Solar Energy as 
Britain, THE GUARDIAN, July 23, 2007, at 27. 
 277. See Landler, supra note 274. 
 278. BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR UMWELT, NATURSCHUTZ UND RAKTORSICHERHEIT, 
DEVELOPMENT OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES IN GERMANY IN 2007 at 7 (2008), available at 
http://download.inogate.org/Seminar%201516%20April%202008%20%93EE,%20DSM%20&
%20RES%94/DENA%20Documentation/background_paper_renewables_Germany_2007_en.p
df. 
 279. Seager, supra note 276, at 27. 
 280. See Landler, supra note 277. 
 281. BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR UMWELT, NATURSCHUTZ UND RAKTORSICHERHEIT, supra 
note 278, at 3. 
 282. Seager, supra note 276, at 27. 
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investors to secure contracts, which may not be long-term, for energy 
and for RECs.  Finding long-term contracts for two commodities in 
two different markets injects more risk for investors.  Research by the 
Fraunhofer Institut found that capital costs for renewable energy 
investments are significantly lower in countries using feed-in tariffs 
than in those countries using policies that create higher risks of future 
return on investment.283  The European Commission concluded that 
feed-in tariffs are more effective than quota-based systems like 
RPSs.284 
Feed-in tariffs feature government-established fixed prices.  
Rickerson and Grace argue that feed-in tariffs create as much 
competition as RPS REC policies—the competition is just directed 
via a different mechanism. 285  RPS policies create a market for RECs, 
competitively rewarding renewable energy projects through the sale 
price of RECs.  Developers and investors want the REC to be priced 
so as to fill the gap between what is needed to attract investors to the 
sector via a healthy return on investment and the current wholesale 
transaction price for the generator’s electricity alone. 
Feed-in tariffs, however, set and guarantee higher electricity 
rates; investors compete to build the most cost-effective renewable 
energy projects and therefore receive the highest return on 
investment.  With feed-in tariffs, the government sets the price and 
guarantees interconnection and contract security, while the market 
determines the amount of renewable energy projects put into 
operation at that price level.  Feed-in tariffs, when successfully 
implemented, create a race to produce the least expensive and most 
efficient projects.  The lower the project cost, the higher the return on 
investment guaranteed by the feed-in tariff rates. 
B. Feed-in Tariff Concepts Developed in the United States 
Feed-in tariffs have not historically been sanctioned in the 
United States.  The most prevalent renewable energy policy enacted 
by states is the RPS.286  The two are similar to the extent that they 
only qualify renewable power that is actually produced, contrary to 
SBCs, which can subsidize all sorts of development ventures, whether 
or not they ever produce renewable power.  The feed-in tariff does 
this by actually linking the renewable subsidy to the price paid for 
 
 283. HELD ET AL., supra note 258, at 26. 
 284. Id. 
 285. See RICKERSON & GRACE, supra note 253. 
 286. Rickerson et al., supra note 256, at 74. 
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renewable power, while the RPS does this by creating a separate 
tradable renewable attribute, or REC. 
However, the momentum and impact of European feed-in tariff 
policies have dwarfed RPS initiatives in the United States, and some 
U.S. states have begun to propose legislation and adopt policies 
similar to European feed-in tariffs.287  The Solar Electric Power 
Association issued a report in late 2008 urging utilities to adopt feed-
in tariffs,288 apparently oblivious to the legal pitfalls and ramifications 
set forth in the next sections.  As many as ten states have introduced 
actual feed-in tariff legislation, while a handful of others are 
considering feed-in tariff policies.  In addition, a federal feed-in tariff 
has been proposed by Representative Jay Inslee (D-Wash.). 
1. Inslee’s Federal Proposal 
In the spring of 2008, Congressman Inslee introduced federal 
feed-in tariff legislation which would guarantee uniform 
interconnection standards, provide for a mandatory twenty-year 
purchase requirement, and set up rate recovery through a national 
SBC.289  According to a recent analysis, 
[u]nder the proposed law, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) would set standards for the priority 
interconnection and transmission of power from new “renewable 
energy facilities,” which include renewable energy facilities 20 MW 
or less.  The FERC and the states would then be required to 
implement these standards within their own respective areas of 
jurisdiction when renewable energy facility owners request 
interconnection.  The bill would then require all electric utilities in 
the US to enter into fixed-rate, 20-year power purchase agreements 
at the request of any new renewable energy facility owner.  The 
FERC would set minimum national [renewable energy payment] 
rates at levels designed to provide for full cost recovery, plus a 10% 
internal rate of return on investment, for commercialized 
technologies under good resource conditions.  [Renewable energy 
payment] rates would be differentiated on the basis of energy 
technology, the size of the system, and the year that the system was 
placed in service.  Utilities would earn any associated [Renewable 
Energy Credits] (RECs) in order to help meet RPS requirements.  
As with interconnection, the FERC and the states would each 
 
 287. Id. 
 288. Ethan Howland, Utilities, Solar Developers Should Seek New Procurement Approaches, 
Report Says, ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK, Dec. 15, 2008, at 28. 
 289. Jim Peirobon, US Rep. Inslee Introduces Renewable Energy Pricing Legislation, Bill 
Tackles Viability of Federal Pricing Head-On, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM, June 27, 
2008, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/story?id=52899; Home Energy 
Generation Act, H.R.729, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). 
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implement the rules of the Inslee bill for all renewable energy 
facilities that fall within their respective regulatory jurisdictions.  
The bill would [further] facilitate cost recovery through a private 
renewable energy utility organization (called, “RenewCorps”) that 
would be independent, yet subject to FERC oversight.  Utilities 
would be reimbursed by RenewCorps for the additional cost of 
their power purchases, plus all costs associated with 
interconnection and network upgrades needed to accommodate 
these new facilities.  To reimburse utilities, RenewCorps would 
raise revenues through a regionally partitioned national system 
benefits charge on every electric customer in the US.290 
Inslee’s proposal combines feed-in tariffs with RPS and system 
benefit charge concepts similar to state programs to date.291  This 
proposed legislative scheme allows a twenty-year tariff payment at 
prescribed rates federally established and differentiated by 
technology.292  These payments would be linked to new, federally-
created RECs.293  There would also be linkage to a new federal system 
benefits charge.294  Therefore, the federal scheme would co-opt 
several state concepts. 
Inslee’s proposal amends the FPA and repeals section 210 of 
PURPA.295  Facilities choosing the feed-in tariff would not be eligible 
for other federal tax incentives or state RECs.296  Inslee has asserted 
that the purpose of the bill is to create investment security for 
renewable energy project developers.297  Inslee has noted that there 
are significant barriers to passing a national feed-in tariff statute, 
including inequalities that could result from how federal funds are 
allocated to individual states.298  The proposal has not yet advanced to 
law. 
 
 290. WILSON RICKERSON ET AL, FEED-IN TARIFFS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE USA 
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 291. See Home Energy Generation Act. 
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 296. Renewable Energy Jobs and Security Act, H.R. 6401, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 297. Press Release, Jay Inslee, Representative, House Bill Would Guarantee Rates for 
Clean-Energy Generators (June 26, 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/ 
list/press/wa01_inslee/renewableenergypayments.shtml. 
 298. See WILSON RICKERSON ET AL., FEED-IN TARIFFS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE 
USA—A POLICY UPDATE 11–14 (2008). 
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2. State Legislative Action 
There are several state feed-in tariff style incentives proposed 
and on the horizon but not yet enacted.  These are outlined below. 
California – The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) 
established the California Solar Initiative.299  This initiative is a 
performance-based incentive where solar energy generators can 
receive a five-year contract worth up to $0.39 per kWh for power 
sold.300  The program is similar to a German-style feed-in tariff, but is 
shorter in contract term and well below the rates in Germany.301  The 
incentive amounts decrease over time after legislative targets for 
installed solar capacity are met.302 
In February of 2008, the CPUC adopted the Onsite Renewable 
Generation feed-in tariff, which provides a ten-, fifteen-, or twenty-
year contract for renewable energy systems smaller than 1.5 MW in 
capacity.303  The contract price is based on the average cost of 
electricity production, adjusted for the spot market and time of 
delivery value.304  There are three additional proposals in the 
California legislature that would expand feed-in tariff options for 
renewable energy generation.305 
In December 2008, “the presiding commissioners accepted the 
California Energy Commission (CEC) staff’s recommendation that 
California implement a system of feed-in tariffs.”306  A final report 
was prepared in 2009 for approval by the full CEC.307  “The 
recommendation calls on the Public Utility Commission to . . . 
implement a system of feed-in tariffs for projects up to 20 MW in 
size.”308  The CEC also recommended that the CEC and CPUC 
continue to evaluate feed-in tariffs for projects greater than 20 MW.309 
 
 299. Cooler Planet, California Solar Power Rebates (Sept. 29, 2007), http:// 
solar.coolerplanet.com/Articles/california-solar-power-rebates.aspx. 
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 303. RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 298, at 4. 
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 305. See id. app. at 18. 
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Hawaii – The 2007 legislative session in Hawaii saw four 
proposals for feed-in tariffs.310  The bills were not approved, however, 
and must be reintroduced in the 2009 session.311  Three of the 
proposals sought to establish twenty-year contracts at a rate of $0.70 
per kWh for solar systems up to twenty MW in capacity, and the 
other proposal set the rate at $0.45 per kWh.312  The bills would only 
have applied the feed-in tariff rates to excess electricity from net-
metered systems.313 
Michigan – Michigan House Bill No. 5218, the “Michigan 
Renewable Energy Sources Act,” was introduced on September 15, 
2007.314  This bill provides that electric utilities must enter into power 
purchase agreements for a term of not less than twenty years, and 
must purchase all electricity from eligible electric generators in the 
state at the rate needed for development plus a reasonable profit, but 
not less than specified rates.315  These rates are the same as Germany’s 
and would be the highest in North America.316  These rates are: 
 $0.10 per kWh for electricity from hydroelectric projects 
less than 500 kW; 
 $0.145 per kWh for electricity from biogas projects less 
than 150 kW; 
 $0.19 per kWh for electricity from geothermal projects 
less than five MW; 
 $0.65 per kWh for electricity from rooftop solar 
installations less than thirty kW; 
 $0.71 per kWh for electricity from solar cladding less than 
thirty kW; 
 $0.105 per kWh for electricity from commercial wind 
projects; and 
 $0.25 per kWh for electricity from small wind turbines.317 
The Michigan bill has been referred to committee and is on hold 
while Renewable Portfolio options are being considered.318  Support 
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 312. Id. 
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for the bill exists in the House, but there seems to be opposition in 
the Senate.319 
Illinois – Illinois sought to adopt a program similar to the 
Michigan proposal in December of 2007.320  However, the bill, HB 
5855, was instead amended to provide only solar generators a net-
metering rate of 200% the retail rate for electricity.321  The proposal 
would also allow utilities to enter into twenty-year contracts with 
renewable energy generators.322  The bill could be introduced as part 
of a net-metering bill in the next legislative session.323 
Minnesota – State Representative David Bly introduced bill 
HF3537.324  The bill is similar to the Michigan proposal, except that in 
order to receive the incentive, the generators must be majority-owned 
by Minnesota residents, limited liability companies, non-profits, 
governments, tribal councils, or electric cooperatives.325  This language 
has dormant commerce clause implications as well as the PURPA 
implications discussed below.  The measure was opposed by utilities 
and did not make it out of the House.326 
Rhode Island – In 2008 a bill was introduced which was similar to 
the Michigan bill, offering a twenty-year contract at rates that vary 
depending on the capacity of the generator.327  For example, wind 
energy projects between 20 and 50 MW receive $0.105 per kWh and 
systems under twenty MW receive $0.115 per kWh.328  Other 
technologies receive rates 1.15 times the avoided cost rates.  The bill 
is still being negotiated.329 
3. Other States Considering Feed-in Tariffs 
Florida – In December 2008, the Gainesville, Florida City 
Commission approved a tariff of $0.32 per kWh under Gainesville 
 
 318. See RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 301, at 5. 
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 324. See RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 301, at 6. 
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Regional Utilities’ proposed feed-in tariff program.330  The program 
pays both residential and business customers the $0.32 rate.331  The 
city launched the program in March of 2009.332 
Indiana – State Representative Matt Pierce introduced HB 1622, 
the “Advanced Renewable Energy Tariffs Act,”333 into the Indiana 
General Assembly in January 2009.334  The bill received first reading 
on January 16, 2009. 335  HB 1622 is patterned after the Michigan bill.336 
Vermont – In 2008, the Vermont Sustainably Priced Energy 
Enterprise Development Program was amended to allow projects less 
than one MW in capacity to enter into contracts fifteen years in 
length, at prices adequate to promote renewable resources.337  This 
program could be developed into a feed-in tariff if the contract rates 
are high enough to promote renewable resource development.338  So 
while the legislation has been enacted, it is not formally a feed-in 
tariff, although it has the potential to perform as one. 
Wisconsin – The Governor’s Task Force on Global Warming 
recommended adopting an advanced renewable tariff for projects 15 
MW in capacity and smaller.339  The rates recommended are cost plus 
profit rates.340  Wisconsin’s Public Service Commission opened a 
further investigation of Advanced Renewable Tariff Development, 
essentially the feed-in tariff, in January of 2009.341 
It becomes more important to understand the legal implications 
of a feed-in tariff structure as it is being increasingly considered in the 
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United States.  With a federalist system, especially for electric power, 
there are bright jurisdictional lines between state and federal legal 
authority over these transactions. 
C. Federal Preemption of State Authority for Wholesale Rates 
Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA empower FERC to regulate 
rates for the interstate and wholesale sale and transmission of 
electricity.342  In doing so, the act bestows upon FERC broad power to 
shape the energy market and affect all stakeholders: generators, 
retailers, and consumers.  The act creates a “bright line” between 
state and federal jurisdiction with wholesale power sales falling on the 
affirmative federal side of the line,343 and FERC jurisdiction preempts 
state regulation of wholesale power transactions and prices. 
Where federal law occupies the field and there is evidence of a 
pervasive federal scheme in a given area, by inference, courts will 
find state or local legislation preempted . . . . Even where there is 
no congressional intent evident to federally occupy a field, the 
conflict principle requires that a court strike inconsistent state or 
local law.  State regulation is not allowed to veto the regulatory 
scheme of a superior level of government.  Correspondingly, courts 
hold that where state and federal laws complement each other, 
there is no preemption.344 
 
 342. Federal Regulation and Development of Power (“Federal Power Act”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 
824d–e. 
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County, Wash, 128 S.Ct. 2733 (2008).  The Supreme Court in its decision criticized the reasoning 
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, but nonetheless agreed with and upheld the 
FERC has exclusive authority, and responsibility, to review long-term power crises, wholesale 
market manipulation by a party to the power sale contract that would negate existing contract 
protections, and wholesale rates.  Morgan Stanley Capital Group, 128 S.Ct. at 2749.  The 
Supreme Court criticized the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit instituting a rate “zone of 
reasonableness” on FERC determinations, which would be “a reinstitution of cost-based rather 
than contract-based regulation.”  Id. at 2748.  The Court did not want to impose this cost 
calculation burden on FERC regarding every market-based contract.  Id. at 2749.  The 5-2 
decision by Justice Scalia upheld the tougher “public interest” standard to only abrogate 
contracts in those “extraordinary circumstances where the public will be severely harmed,” as 
articulated by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, with a new affirmative twist regarding market 
manipulation.  Id.  The FERC was told to “amplify or clarify its findings.  Id. at 2750.  Market 
turmoil or chaos, even rendering a power market dysfunctional, alone are not sufficient to 
negate existing wholesale power contracts, which are designed, in part, to hedge against certain 
market risks.  Of the four wholesale contracts at issue in this litigation, one with Dynegy had 
already expired by its terms at the time of this Supreme Court 2008 decision, and three with 
Shell, PPM and Sempra had not yet terminated.  For a discussion of the California and Western 
energy crisis that spawned this litigation, see Steven Ferrey, Soft Paths, Hard Choices: 
Environmental Lessons in the Aftermath of California’s Electric Deregulation Debacle, 23 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 251 (2004). 
 344. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 113–14. 
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The North American power grid is composed of many individual 
pieces owned by the local transmission companies, which operate 
under the overlapping jurisdiction of fifty-five state and provincial 
government agencies, as well as three national regulatory 
authorities.  [Within the United States,] FERC regulates entirely 
wholesale power transactions.  The Federal Power Act defines 
“sale at wholesale” as any sale to any person for resale.  FERC also 
regulates power generation to a limited degree, power transmission 
in interstate commerce, and interstate power sales.345 
FERC jurisdiction is plenary and extends to all sales in interstate 
commerce.346  FERC does not regulate the local distribution of power, 
power solely in intrastate commerce, or the self-generation and use of 
power.347 
There is no statutorily or judicially imposed threshold amount of 
interstate sale of power, which triggers FERC jurisdiction.  
Although the amount of power an electric utility may place in 
interstate commerce is de minimis compared to the same utility’s 
sales in intrastate commerce, FERC may assert its regulatory 
authority over such a utility.  If a small amount of interstate power 
is commingled with intrastate power, the entire amount of power 
becomes “interstate” for purposes of vesting FERC with the 
authority to exercise jurisdiction.  Once FERC exercised 
jurisdiction over a utility, the entire wholesale structure of the 
entity’s operations becomes subject to FERC regulation.348 
There is no doubt that renewable power sales are designed to 
affect (1) wholesale power transactions and (2) interstate power 
transactions.  Both of these are subject to exclusive federal 
jurisdiction; state authority is preempted.  Recent jurisprudence has 
accentuated the exclusivity of FERC’s power in not only setting “just 
and reasonable rates” but also exclusively ensuring the performance 
of the energy market.  As the Ninth Circuit has remarked, and the 
Supreme Court confirmed, when combined with federal preemption 
precedent, energy market regulatory reforms have contributed to “a 
massive shift in regulatory jurisdiction from the states to the FERC.” 
349 
 
 345. Ferrey, supra at note 68, at 164. 
 346. N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 344 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Minn. 1984). 
 347. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515, 523 (1945); City of 
Batavia v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 672 F.2d 64, 68 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that 
the FERC regulates wholesale transactions and states regulate retail transactions). 
 348. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 109–10. 
 349. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 471 F.3d at 1066; see also Entergy La., Inc., v. La. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 47 (2003) (noting that the filed rate doctrine applies to the states through 
federal preemption). 
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D. The Filed-Rate Doctrine 
If a utility or independent power producer is subject to FERC 
jurisdiction and regulation, state regulation of the same operational 
aspects is preempted as a matter of federal law.  Principles of 
preemption require a state regulatory agency to accept and pass 
through in retail rates all cost items deemed by FERC to be “just 
and reasonable,” and which are otherwise allowed.  Therefore, a 
FERC determination regarding any aspect of a wholesale price is 
universally binding. 
The so-called “filed-rate doctrine” holds that state regulatory 
commissions may not second-guess or overrule on any grounds a 
wholesale rate determination made pursuant to federal jurisdiction.  
The Supreme Court in 1986 and again in 1988 [and 2003], upheld 
the filed-rate doctrine.350 
In their 2003 decision, the Supreme Court clarified that there is 
little residual “prudency” authority, as initially supposed by some 
states, reserving a state role in determining the ultimate choice of 
certain suppliers in wholesale power market transactions.351 
This final point is important.  Until 2003, some states presumed 
that the Pike County prudency concept, which recognized utility cost 
recovery for imprudent decision making, would allow a state to 
determine from whom power should prudently be obtained, and 
would allow states to modify or overrule FERC-approved wholesale 
market orders or rules—under the guise of supervising the prudent 
operation of the integrated power markets in their states.352  This 
theory of residual authority to overrule company allocation of costs 
was deflated by the Supreme Court in its 2003 Entergy opinion.353  The 
Court found that states are unable to tamper, directly or indirectly, 
with wholesale market operations approved by a FERC order or 
operating subject to FERC-approved tariffs.354  States’ deliberate 
attempts to design renewable power or carbon regulation (such as 
RGGI regulations) to tilt the wholesale market operation, power 
pricing, and dispatch order in wholesale markets operating pursuant 
to FERC-approved tariffs runs counter to the 2003 opinion of the 
Supreme Court in Entergy. 
 
 350. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 114–15. 
 351. Entergy La., 539 U.S. at 39. 
 352. See Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Pa Pub. Util. Comm’n, 465 A.2d 735, 738 (Pa. 
Comm. Ct. 1983). 
 353. Entergy La., 539 U.S. at 49. 
 354. Id. at 47. 
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Pursuant to the filed-rate doctrine, the filed federal rate becomes 
“the legal rate.”355  Outside the regulatory scheme, the filed rate 
cannot be attacked on the grounds that it was the result of improper 
conduct.356  “[T]he filed rate doctrine bars all claims – state and 
federal – that attempt to challenge the terms of a tariff that a federal 
agency has reviewed and filed.”357 
Bad conduct or wrongdoing by a party does not set aside the 
filed-rate doctrine.358  FERC adoption of market-based rates in a state 
does not obviate the filed-rate doctrine.359  Pursuant to EP Act 2005, 
FERC codified new anti-fraud rules for natural gas and electricity 
markets in Order No. 670, covering schemes to defraud, make untrue 
statements of a material fact or omit material facts, or to engage in 
any fraud or deceit upon any entity.360  Despite these new anti-fraud 
rules, even an “unlawful” act of fraud does not negate the filed-rate 
doctrine.361  FERC, through the regulatory scheme, is the only party 
that has a remedy when fraud has been committed.362  Any conflicting 
state determinations are barred.363 
Feed-in tariff rates above avoided cost result in at least a 
temporary, and perhaps longer, increased cost of electricity.  And 
here lies the conundrum: Does this conflict with either the 
requirements of PURPA, which are part of the FPA, or the general 
 
 355. Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 256 (1951); Keogh v. Chi. 
& Nw. Ry, 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922). 
 356. Ark. La Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577–78 (1981). 
 357. People of Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, 375 F.3d 831, 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal 
citations omitted); see also Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 295 F.3d 
918, 929 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 358. See e.g., Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163 (1922) (“The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be 
varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.”); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier 
Tariff Bur., 476 U.S. 409, 417 (1986) (hearing challenge to collusion to set higher rates); 
Wegoland, Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that there is no fraud 
exception to filed rate doctrine); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 492 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(reasoning that intentional misconduct of a party is not an exception to filed rate doctrine). 
 359. See Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 853. 
 360. FERC Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 114 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,047 (2006). 
 361. See e.g., Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 20 (noting that while plaintiffs “ argue that there should 
be an exception to the filed rate doctrine when there are allegations of fraud . . . every court that 
has considered the plaintiffs’ argument has rejected the notion that there is a fraud exception to 
the filed rate doctrine”). 
 362. Taffett v. S. Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir 1992); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of 
Snohomish, County Wash. v. Dynergy Power Mktg Inc., 384 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 363. In re: Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, Slip Op., Case 2:03-
cv-01431-PMP-PAL MDL-1566, May 15, 2008. 
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rate-setting requirements of FERC under the FPA?364  A series of 
court decisions over the past two decades makes this a very 
appropriate question under the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution. 
PURPA was designed to promote renewables while protecting 
consumers from artificially increasing costs of electricity resulting 
therefrom.365  The promotion of renewable energy is premised on 
renewable energy generators receiving only the utility’s average 
avoided cost.366  Thus, retail energy consumers should be indifferent 
to the amount of renewable power purchased at these rates, because 
the rates are identical to the utility’s costs.  PURPA, therefore, 
specifically provides that no rule requiring a utility to purchase energy 
from a QF “shall provide for a rate which exceeds the incremental 
cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy.”367  
“Alternative” in this context does not refer to renewable energy 
sources but rather to electricity produced by any generator but that 
utility. 
Congressional hearings emphasized the use of avoided cost 
methodologies to determine the cost of acquiring alternative electric 
power, and showed the desire that no particular electricity producer 
would subsidize the inefficiency of another.368  These congressional 
hearings also illustrated that Congress’ intent was to avoid promoting 
alternative energy sources beyond the point of cost-effectiveness.  
This desire was evident in both the House and Senate.  During 
hearings on PURPA, Senator Percy stated that “[i]t would be wrong 
to subsidize small [power] producers at the expense of other 
customers.”369  “Senator Durkin added during floor debate that 
 
 364. Federal Regulation and Development of Power (“Federal Power Act”), 16 U.S.C. 824a 
(2006). 
 365. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 17. 
 366. Federal Regulation and Development of Power (“Federal Power Act”), 16 U.S.C. § 
824a-3(b) (2006) (providing that a rate may not “exceed[] the incremental cost to the electric 
utility of alternative electric energy”); 18 C.F.R. 292.304(a)(2) (providing that no electric utility 
shall “pay more than the avoided costs for purchases”). 
 367. See Windway Techs., Inc v. Midland Power Coop., 2001 WL 1248741 at *4 (N.D. Iowa 
2001) (quoting .16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)). 
 368. Miles, supra note 73, at 1284 n.99 (citing Public Utility Rate Proposals of President 
Carter's Energy Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and 
Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 
at 189 (1977)). 
 369. Id. at 1285 (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 25,848 (1977) (statement of Sen. Percy)). 
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utilities should be required to set purchase rates for hydroelectric 
generators at cost, rather than at a subsidized rate.”370 
1. The Green Energy Limited Exemption 
Only two very limited exceptions legally allow utilities to pay in 
excess, or to have states mandate that utilities pay in excess, of 
avoided costs to a QF for renewable energy produced and delivered.  
The first exception applies when the excess cost is for a Green Energy 
Program in which utility customers individually voluntarily agree to 
higher rates covering the costs above the utility’s avoided cost.371  A 
cost-recovering and appropriately-priced green electricity purchase 
would likely be prohibitively expensive to many consumers, 
compared to the rates for conventional purchase of electricity.372  For 
example, voluntary programs consisting of RPS-eligible RECs and 
future RECs can vary in cost from $0.014 per kWh to, in 
Massachusetts, $0.50 per kWh.373 
2. The Net Metering Exemption 
The second exception applies to net metering.  On March 28, 
2001, FERC held that state net metering decisions were not 
preempted by federal law, because no sale occurs when an individual 
homeowner, farmer, or similar entity installs distributed generation 
and accounts for its dealings with the utility through the practice of 
netting.374  FERC deemed that a transfer of title to power does not 
constitute a “sale.”375 
Oregon has gone even further.  The Oregon Public Utilities 
Commission (OPUC) in 2008, ruled that its RPS program applies to 
an entity that: generates renewable power; is located on the customer-
 
 370. Id. 
 371. The Florida Public Service Commission found that a Green-Pricing program does not 
violate PURPA and its implementing rules.  However, the Florida PSC made it clear that the 
Commission did not answer the question of whether circumstances might exist where prices in 
excess of avoided cost could be borne by the general body of ratepayers, or the question of the 
amount the utility or its green electricity customers could pay.  In re Fla. Power & Light Co., 219 
P.U.R.4th 46, 49 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2002). 
 372. A state feed-in tariff program could be implemented as a “green electricity” purchase 
but would have to include RECs in those half of the states that have them and fit into state 
regulatory structures, such as existing renewable portfolio standard regulations.  Voluntary 
programs; however, would not likely create the aggressive investment market climate desired by 
a feed-in tariff due to uncertainty that a voluntary program could be discontinued at any time. 
 373. NSTAR Green, supra note 236. 
 374. Steven Ferrey, Net Metering, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA. OF ENERGY ENGINEERING AND 
TECH. 1096, 1098 (Barney L Capehart ed., 2007). 
 375. Id. 
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generator’s premises; can operate in parallel with an electric utility’s 
existing transmission and distribution facilities; and is intended 
primarily to offset some of the customer-generator’s own electricity 
requirements.376  OPUC held that a customer-generator need not be 
both a customer and a generator.  The “customer-generator” label 
could apply to a customer who hired a third party to own or install 
and operate on the customer’s premises a self-generation unit that 
supplied power behind the meter.377  No limitation was placed on 
third-party ownership, and the sale of such power to the customer-
generator was not deemed to be a regulated retail sale of power, 
because FERC took the position that, under federal law, net metering 
does not necessarily involves a sale.  Thus, because the net-metered 
transaction between the customer-generator and the utility is not a 
sale at all, the prior sale from the third-party to the customer-
generator was not a “sale for resale.”378  The regulated utility is not 
required in any manner to determine who owns net-metered 
facilities.379  If the renewable net-metered facility takes advantage of 
multiple federal and state trust fund subsidies and tax credits and 
benefits, it is still eligible for net metering.380  The third-party owner of 
the renewable generation equipment can still collect RECs associated 
with the sale of power from the net-metered facility.381  The ability to 
quadruple-dip into RECs, net metering, tax incentives, and system 
benefit trust funds or other subsidies is not uniformly allowed in the 
states.382 
Eighty percent of the states have electively adopted “net 
metering,” which runs the retail utility meter backwards when a 
renewable energy generator puts power back to the grid.383  Net 
 
 376. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., Order No. 08-388 at 4–5 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n July 31, 2008), 
available at http://apps.puc.state.or.us/orders/2008ords/08-388.pdf (interpreting the definition of 
a net metering facility under ORS 757.300(1)(d)). 
 377. Id. at 7–8. 
 378. Id. at 10.  The Commission relied on the FERC determination in In re  Mid-America 
Co., 94 FERC ¶ 61,340, 62,263 (2001).  The Oregon Commission also held that the third-party 
owner of the net metered generator was not a retail electric service provider under state law 
because it offered does not generally offer service other than to selected on-premises parties, 
did not used the  utility’s distribution system, and did not provide any ancillary services.   It also 
was not a utility and did not have to serve 100 percent of premises load.  The regular public 
utility must serve all other power and back-up needs of the customer.  Id. 
 379. Honeywell Int’l, supra note 376, at 18. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. at 19. 
 382. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 24. 
 383. Ferrey, supra note 3748, at 1096. 
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metering can pay the eligible renewable energy source approximately 
four times more for this power when it rolls backwards at the retail 
rate than paid to any other independent power generators for 
wholesale power, and much more than the time-dependent value of 
this power to the purchasing utility.384  The state positions on net 
metering are set forth in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: STATE NET METERING REGULATIONS385 
State Eligible 
Technologies 
Eligible 
Customers 
Limits 
Size 
Limitations 
Price Authorization 
Arizona Renewables & 
cogeneration 
 < 100 kW Excess* 
purchased at 
avoided cost 
Ariz. Corp. 
Comm. 
Decision No. 
52345 
California Solar and wind Residential 
and Small 
Commercial 
< 10 kW Excess 
purchased at 
avoided cost; 
month-to-
month 
carryover 
allowed 
w/utility 
consent 
Calif. Pub. 
Util. Code 
§2827 
Colorado All resources  < 10 kW Excess carried 
over month-
to-month 
Pub. Svc. Co. 
of Colo., 
Advice Letter 
1265; 
Decision 
C96-901 
Connecticut Renewables & 
cogeneration 
 < 50 kW for 
cogeneration; 
< 100 kW for 
renewables 
Excess 
purchased at 
avoided cost 
Dept. of Pub. 
Util/ Control, 
Order No. 
159 
 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. at 1098–1100. 
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Idaho Renewables & 
cogeneration 
Residential 
and small 
commercial 
< 100 kW Excess 
purchased at 
avoided cost 
ID PUC 
Orders Nos. 
16025 (1980); 
26750 (1997) 
Indiana Renewables & 
cogeneration 
 < 1,000 
kWh/month 
Excess is 
“granted” to 
the utility; No 
purchase of 
excess 
170 IN 
Admin. Code 
§4-4, 1-7 
Iowa Renewables  No size limit Excess 
purchased at 
avoided cost 
Iowa Util. 
Bd., Utilities 
Division Rule 
§15.11(5) 
Maine Renewables & 
cogeneration 
 < 100 kW Excess 
purchased at 
avoided cost 
Me. PU Code 
Ch. 36, 
§§1(A)(18), 
(19), §4(C)(4) 
Maryland Solar Residential < 80 kW Excess carried 
over to 
following 
month 
Maryland 
Art. 78, §54M 
Massachusetts Renewables & 
cogeneration 
 < 60 kW = 
Class I 
Between 60 
kW and 1 
MW = Class 
II 
Between 1-2 
MW = Class 
III386 
Excess 
purchased at 
avoided cost 
Mass. Gen. 
Laws c. 164, 
§1G(g); 
D.T.E. Order 
97-111 Note: 
< 30 kW 220 
CMR 
§8.04(2) 
Minnesota Renewables & 
cogeneration 
 < 40 kW Excess 
purchased at 
“average retail 
utility energy 
rate” 
Minn. Stat. 
§261B.164(3) 
Nevada Solar and wind  < 10 kW Excess 
purchased at 
Nev. R. Stat. 
Ch. 704 
 
 386. The recent Green Communities Act in Massachusetts provides for Class I, II, III, 
neighborhood, solar and wind net metering facilities with wind and solar up to 2 MW allowed to 
net meter.  Green Communities Act, S. No. 2768, 185th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2007). 
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avoided cost; 
annualization 
allowed 
New Hampshire Solar, wind & 
hydro 
 < 25 kW PUC may 
require 
‘netting’ over 
12-month 
period; 
retailing 
wheeling 
allowed for up 
to 3 customers 
 
New Mexico Renewables, 
fuel cells, micro 
turbines 
 < 1,000 kW Excess 
credited to 
following 
month; unused 
credit is 
granted to 
utility at end 
of 12-month 
period 
NM PUC 
Order 2847 
(11/30/98) 
New York Solar Residential < 10 kW Excess 
credited to 
following 
month; unused 
credit is 
granted to 
utility at end 
of 12-month 
period 
NY Public 
Service Stat. 
§66-j 
North Dakota Renewables & 
cogeneration 
 < 100 kW Excess 
purchased at 
avoided cost 
N.D. Admin. 
Code §69-09-
07-09 
Oklahoma Renewables & 
cogeneration 
 < 100 kW and 
annual output 
< 25,000 kWh 
Excess is 
“granted” to 
the utility; no 
purchase of 
excess 
Ok. 
Corporations 
Comm. 
Schedule QF-
2 
Pennsylvania Renewables  < 50 kW Excess 
purchased at 
wholesale rate 
PECO Rate 
R-S, Supp. 5 
to PA Tariff 
Ferrey_final_cpcxns.doc 2/22/2010  9:33:43 AM 
190 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM Vol. 20:125 
PUC No. 2, 
Page 43A 
Rhode Island Renewables & 
cogeneration 
 < 25 kW for 
larger 
utilities; 
< 15 kW for 
smaller 
utilities 
Excess 
purchased at 
avoided cost 
PUC Supp. 
Decision and 
Order, 
Docket No. 
1549 
Texas Renewables  < 50 kW Excess 
purchased at 
avoided cost 
Texas PUC, 
Rule 
§23.66(f)(4) 
Vermont Solar, wind, 
fuel cells using 
renewable fuel, 
anaerobic 
digestion 
Residential, 
commercial, 
and 
agricultural 
customers 
<15 kW, 
except 
< 100 kW for 
anaerobic 
digesters 
Excess carried 
over month-
to-month; any 
residual excess 
at end of year 
is “granted” to 
the utility 
Reuse of Net 
Metering, VT. 
PSB Docket 
No. 6181 
(April 21, 
1999) 
Washington Solar, wind and 
hydropower 
 < 25 kW Excess 
credited to 
following 
month; unused 
credit is 
granted to 
utility at end 
of 12-month 
period 
 
Wisconsin All Resources All retail 
customers 
< 20 kW Excess 
purchased at 
retail rate for 
renewables, 
avoided cost 
for non-
renewables 
Pub. Svc. 
Comm. 
Schedule PG-
4 
Connecticut Solar, wind, 
hydro, fuel cell, 
sustainable 
biomass 
Residential No size limit Not specified CT Public 
Act 98-28 
(1998) 
Illinois (pending) Solar and wind All retail 
customers 
< 40 kW Excess carried 
over month-
to-month; any 
Ill. Legis. S.B. 
1228 
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residual excess 
at end of year 
is purchased at 
avoided cost 
Maine Renewables or 
other 
applicable 
technology 
 < 100 kW Excess carried 
over month-
to-month; any 
residual excess 
at end of 12-
month period 
is eliminated 
Me. PU Code 
Ch. §313 
(1998); PUC 
Order No. 
98-621 
(December 
19, 1998). [35-
A MRSA 
§3210(2)(C)] 
Puerto Rico 
(pending) 
Renewables Residential < 50 kW Excess carried 
over month-
to-month; any 
residual excess 
at end of year 
is purchased at 
avoided cost 
 
*“Excess” refers to the “net excess generation” of electricity by the customer-generator (i.e., 
generation exceeds consumption) during the billing period. 
By turning the meter backwards, net metering effectively 
compensates the generator at the full retail rate for transferring just 
the wholesale energy commodity.  While most states compensate the 
generator for excess generation at the avoided cost or market-
determined wholesale rate, as Table 7 below shows, some states 
compensate the wholesale energy seller for the excess at the much 
higher retail rate. 
“[E]lectricity is a unique energy form: It cannot be stored or 
conserved with any efficiency.  Therefore, electricity has substantially 
different value at different hours of the day, different seasons of the 
year, and at different places in the utility system.”387 
Contrary to this physical reality, net metering and billing treats all 
power [at all hours] as being tangibly storable [or bankable] and 
having equal value, when in fact it is not and does not.  By ignoring 
interim actual physical transfers of power occurring at all the 
minutes and hours of the month, and recognizing only the net 
balance of the transactions at the end of the month or quarter, net 
metering assumes all electricity generated and transmitted has 
equal [average] value. 
 
 387. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 119. 
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It is even possible to “game” the system with net metering—selling 
power to the utility at the netted average retail price in off-peak 
late evening hours when the customer/generator has no need for 
the power . . . and the utility has surplus power . . . .  Other utility 
ratepayers will be left to make up the revenue deficit that occurs.388 
Thus, 
[h]ow states treat net energy generation (NEG) is one of the more 
controversial aspects of net metering. NEG is the net surplus of 
electricity sold to the utility compared to electricity purchased from 
the utility over a given (typically monthly) billing period.  Some 
states allow any such surplus to be carried over as a credit against 
the next month, with some limiting the duration of this carry-over 
to a year.  At the end of the year, the surplus is either forfeited to 
the utility, or to low-income energy assistance programs 
administered by the utility (which effectively pay the utility bill of 
customers who have not paid).  Still, other programs allow the 
customer to receive cash for the NEG.389 
The net metering statuses of representative northeast states are 
set forth in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Seven Northeast State Net Metering Rules390 
State Eligible 
Technology 
Eligible 
Customers Limits 
Size Limits Net Energy 
Generation (NEG) 
Reconciliation 
Connecticut Renewables, 
MSW 
cogeneration  and 
fuel cells 
Commercial and 
residential 
customers 
•50kW 
cogeneration 
•100kW 
renewables 
NEG purchased @ 
avoided cost 
Maine Renewables, 
MSW and fuel 
cells 
All customer 
classes 
•100kW Credited forward 
monthly; annual 
NEG granted to 
utilities 
Maryland Renewables Commercial, 
residential and 
schools 
•500kW Monthly 
NEG granted to 
utilities 
(in flux) 
 
 388. Id. at 119–20. 
 389. Ferrey, supra note 383, at 1098. 
 390. Id. at 1098-1100. 
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Table 7: Seven Northeast State Net Metering Rules390 
State Eligible 
Technology 
Eligible 
Customers Limits 
Size Limits Net Energy 
Generation (NEG) 
Reconciliation 
Massachusetts MSW, 
renewables, and 
cogeneration 
All customer 
classes 
< 60 kW = Class I 
Between 60 kW 
and 1 MW = Class 
II 
Between 1-2 MW 
= Class III391 
Monthly NEG 
credited forward 
New Jersey Renewables and 
fuel cells 
Residential and 
commercial 
•2MW Annualized NEG 
purchased at 
avoided cost 
New York Biogas, wind, 
solar PV 
Agricultural and 
residential only 
10-400kW Monthly credited 
forward; Annualized 
NEG purchased at 
avoided cost 
Rhode Island Renewables, 
MSW and fuel 
cells 
All customer 
classes 
•25kW (up to 
1MW in 
Narragansett 
service territory) 
Monthly NEG 
credited forward; 
Annual NEG 
granted to utilities 
 
3. Legally Reconciling Feed-in Tariffs 
PURPA regulations require that a utility purchase energy from 
qualifying QF renewable energy sources at avoided cost.392  One way 
around PURPA might be for surplus payments to be made to the 
producer based on the capacity, availability, or fact of contract 
production, not based on the actual quantity of electricity.  However, 
with some regions now making explicit forward capacity payments,393 
even this would draw legal scrutiny.  Electricity from a QF must be 
 
 391. The recent Green Communities Act, S. No. 2768, 185th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2007), 
provides for Class I, II, III, neighborhood, solar and wind net metering facilities with wind and 
solar up to 2 MW allowed to net meter. 
 392. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a) (2006). 
 393. The Independent System Operator of New England awards forward capacity payments 
through an annual auction and reconfiguration auctions for supplying capacity to the system.  
See ISO New England, Forward Capacity markets, http://www.isone.com/markets/ 
othrmkts_data/fcm/index.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2009). 
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purchased at the purchasing utility’s avoided cost rate.  A 
“performance-based incentive” could operate like a theoretical feed-
in tariff, but could be a separate payment from the power purchase 
made by the utility either with or without net metering.  If the 
payment were a subsidy and not a long-term energy contract, it could 
possibly get around the avoided cost ceiling under PURPA.  A utility 
or ratepayer, however, could argue that the requirement acts like an 
energy contract at inflated prices.  Ultimately, a semantic difference 
may not be enough to survive a constitutional challenge. 
A seller of power can be paid appreciably more for its power 
under a net-metered purchase, as described above, than through a 
non-net-metered purchase, which increases the price above avoided 
cost in the same way that feed-in tariffs do.  Under some state net 
metering systems, states can require utilities to pay for net-metered 
wholesale electricity sales at retail rates, which are significantly above 
the avoided cost rates (which reflect wholesale rates).394  The excess 
power, even if transferred back against the utility’s wishes, is not a 
“sale” if the state so determines under net metering rules, and power 
used on-site is also not a “sale” under the concept that only the net 
value at the end of the billing period reflects the actual net metered 
sale.395 
Incentives to promote renewable energy that do not fall under 
PURPA include RPSs, taxes on fossil fuel generation, and tax 
incentives available to utilities buying renewable energy.  These types 
of renewable energy incentives could be classified as non-rate 
mechanisms, and therefore would not be subject to maximum avoided 
cost PURPA restrictions on wholesale power sale prices.396 The EP 
Act of 2005 and existing state regulations related to reliability and 
distribution might allow for certain methods of utility cost-recovery 
through a distribution charge, as FERC does not have authority to 
regulate local distribution charges.  However, this would have to be 
cleverly structured to pass muster.  Production could be metered by 
the utility, through an automated production tracking system, or 
through self-reporting.397 
 
 394. See MidAmerican Energy Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. AA3173, 3195, 3196 (Iowa Dist. 
Ct. May 25, 1999). 
 395. Id. 
 396. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 105. 
 397. See Renewable Energy Trust, Production Tracking System Monthly Reporting, 
http://www.masstech.org/IS/green_buildings/tracking.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2009). 
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States have hung other charges for conservation or solar 
incentive trust fund creation on the local distribution charge.398  
Similarly, a state could force a utility to implement a separate SBC or 
create a renewable energy trust fund to reimburse the utility for 
payments that the utility made above the avoided cost.  However, 
these renewable energy trust funds may also be susceptible to 
constitutional challenges, depending on Commerce Clause issues with 
their design. 
States have debated the merits of feed-in tariffs, and economists 
have written about the most effective and efficient feed-in tariff 
designs.399  However, no one seems to have written about the potential 
constitutional and statutory barriers to implementing feed-in tariffs in 
the United States. 
E. Key State Efforts Constitutionally Stricken: The California Cases 
1. The Ninth Circuit: Independent Energy Producers 
In Independent Energy Producers Association, the California 
state utility commission authorized utilities to monitor QFs to 
determine whether they met federal efficiency standards.400  In 
addition to allowing the monitoring, the state commission allowed the 
utility to suspend payment to the QF if the utility found that the QF 
did not comply with the federal standards.401 The utility was 
authorized to substitute a lower, alternative rate of only eighty 
percent of the avoided cost rate in the event that it determined that 
the QF did not comply.402  CPUC’s decision was challenged and 
appealed.403 
“In examining the program, the court noted that the ‘underlying 
motivation behind the CPUC program [was] to lower the rates set . . . 
[for independent power projects in California] standard offer 
contracts because [those contracts were] higher than . . . current 
avoided costs’” due to the unexpected fall of fossil fuel-fired energy 
costs.404  The Court of Appeals further held that a program where the 
 
 398. See supra Part VI.C. 
 399. See, e.g., Lesser & Su, supra note 264. 
 400. See Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848, 853 (9th 
Cir. 1994). 
 401. Id. at 848. 
 402. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 22 n.85. 
 403. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, 36 F.3d at 853. 
 404. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 22 n.85 (quoting Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, 36 F.3d at 
858). 
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state determined ultimate renewable energy QF status was 
preempted by federal law.405  CPUC’s monitoring program authorized 
states to make QF status determinations, and only the federal 
government via FERC has that authority.406  “Although the court 
found that the program violated federal law by allowing utilities to 
make QF status determinations, the court allowed the utilities to 
continue to monitor the QFs . . . as long as the monitoring 
requirements did not impose an undue burden on the facilities” or 
their QF status.407 
In dicta, the court went into the details of how PURPA 
authorizes states to calculate avoided costs.408  This is where the 
decision will influence and impact any future decision regarding feed-
in tariffs.  The court stated that the rate paid by utilities for electricity 
must be determined by calculating the avoided cost that the utility 
would pay if it had to purchase electricity outside the QF contract 
price.409  Avoided costs must be based on enumerated data regarding 
the utility’s operation cost characteristics and on the availability, 
usefulness, type, and reliability of the energy or capacity that is 
purchased.410  QF efficiency, the court said, is entirely unrelated to the 
utility’s avoided costs.411  The court also commented that PURPA’s 
avoided cost rates are the “statutory ceiling.”412 
Attempts by states to directly or indirectly promote higher 
wholesale energy prices for certain renewable energy projects have 
been stricken by the courts.413  Promotion of certain types of 
renewable fuels for power supply, via a price preference above and 
beyond the FERC-established price of other wholesale power 
 
 405. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, 36 F.3d at 855. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 22 n.85. 
 408. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, 36 F.3d at  854 nn.11 & 12. 
 409. Id. at 857. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id.  Given the impact that efficiency has on the electric grid, a utility would require 
more capacity from lower efficiency QFs to supply an equal amount of effective generating 
capacity from an equivalent capacity but higher efficiency QFs.  These inefficiencies would 
require more interconnection points, construction permits and contract negotiations.  If a court 
found efficiency outside the realm of avoided cost calculations then a court may also find some 
environmental costs to be outside the realm of avoided cost despite the environmental cost 
language in the San Diego G&E case cited below. 
 412. Id. 
 413. Id. (finding no separate basis for the state PUC to act to establish a premium price for 
renewable low-carbon power projects). 
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transactions, was found to be inconsistent with the FPA and was 
stricken.414 
2. The FERC Backstop: Southern California Edison Company,     
 San Diego Gas & Electric415 
FERC also refused to sanction a higher California price for 
renewable power supply.416  Under the filed-rate doctrine, any dispute 
about these matters may not be arbitrated by the state, but is reserved 
exclusively to federal authority.417  CPUC ordered two of its investor-
owned and regulated utilities, Southern California Edison and San 
Diego Gas & Electric, to sign long-term fixed-price contracts with 
QFs to purchase electricity at prices that were competitive with other 
renewable energy prices, but nonetheless in excess of the utilities’ 
avoided cost.418  Edison had wholesale electricity supply options 
available for $0.04 per kWh or less, while CPUC required renewable 
QF contracts as high as $0.066 per kWh.419 
The case went to FERC on challenge.420  FERC ruled that, under 
PURPA, “states have broad powers under state law to direct the 
planning and resource decisions of utilities under their jurisdictions.  
States may, for example, order utilities to build renewable generators 
themselves, or deny certification of other types of facilities if state law 
so permits.”421  The FERC also stated that, “assuming state law 
permits, [states] may order utilities to purchase renewable 
generation” as an alternative to requiring the utility to build its own 
renewable generation.422 
However, the FERC made it clear that PURPA does not permit 
either the FERC or the states to require a purchase rate that exceeds 
the utilities’ avoided cost.423  Avoided cost is defined as “the 
incremental costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or 
both which, but for the purchase from the qualifying facility or 
 
 414. Id. 
 415. See S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215 (1995). 
 416. Id. ¶ 61,125 (1995) (holding the costs of renewable energy not to exceed the market or 
bid price of all other sources of energy makes ratepayers indifferent as to the procurement of 
wholesale power). 
 417. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988). 
 418. S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215 (1995). 
 419. Id. ¶ 61,667. 
 420. S. Cal. Edison Co., 71 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,269 (1995). 
 421. S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61.215, ¶ 61,676 (1995). 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. 
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qualifying facilities, such utility would generate itself or purchase 
from another source.”424  The avoided cost process must reflect prices 
available from all sources able to sell to the utility.425 
This concern does not ameliorate over time: The FERC further 
stated that, “[a]s the electric utility industry becomes increasingly 
competitive, the need to ensure that the states are using procedures 
which ensure that QF rates do not exceed avoided cost becomes more 
critical.”426  This language foreshadowed the FERC EP Act of 2005 
regulations removing utility QF purchasing requirements in Day 2 
markets.427 
The FERC was also careful to point out that its decision did not 
preclude the possibility that, in setting an avoided cost rate, a state 
could account for environmental costs of all fuel sources.428  This 
language leaves open the possibility of “green pricing” options or 
incentives that include RECs like those in New Mexico and 
Wisconsin.  Of course, a state might also otherwise reimburse a utility 
for purchases above avoided costs. 
3. Ninth Circuit Redux: Public Utility District No. 1 of 
Snohomish County Washington 
The Ninth Circuit also rendered a final key decision.429  While 
this decision was reworked by the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal430 
and remanded to FERC for more clarification or explanation,431 it was 
not overturned.  The Court ruled that Congress did not intend that 
the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction over the interstate sale of electricity 
at wholesale be determined by a case-by-case analysis of the impact of 
 
 424. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (2009). 
 425. S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215, ¶ 61,666 (1995). 
 426. Id. ¶¶ 61,675–76. 
 427. See New PURPA Section 210(m) Regulations Applicable to Small Power Production 
and Cogeneration Facilities, Docket No. RM06-10-001; Order No. 688-A, 119 F.E.R.C, ¶ 61,305 
(2007) (order on rehearing and clarification). 
 428. S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215, ¶ 61,676 (1995). 
 429. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County Wash. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 430. Morgan Stanley Capital Group v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County Wash., 
128 S.Ct. 2733 (2008).  The U.S. Supreme Court in its decision criticized the reasoning of the 9th 
Circuit court of Appeals decision, but nonetheless agreed with and upheld the FERC has 
exclusive authority, and responsibility, to review long-term power crises, wholesale market 
manipulation by a party to the power sale contract that would negate existing contract 
protections, and wholesale rates. 
 431. Both P.U.D. No. 1 and Morgan Stanley remanded the case to the FERC. See Morgan 
Stanley Capital Group, 128 S.Ct. 2733 (2008). 
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state regulation on national interests.432  Instead, Congress meant to 
draw a bright line between state and federal jurisdiction.433  State law 
is not allowed to overrule or supplant federal determinations by 
adding requirements not consistent with those in federal law.434 
By exercising exclusive authority over “just and reasonable” 
wholesale or interstate rates and terms, FERC ensures that wholesale 
generators of electric power will charge fair rates to retailers and that 
wholesale generators receive a fair rate of return, and thus have the 
incentive to continue to produce and supply power.435  The FPA 
creates a “bright line” between state and federal jurisdiction, with 
wholesale power sales falling clearly and unequivocally on the federal 
side of the line.436  FERC must protect the state and other 
stakeholders against the state’s own contractual or regulatory actions. 
Specifically, the 2000-2001 California/Western area power 
shortage was significantly linked to California’s restructured power 
market design and regulation.437  When prices subsequently fell, 
California attempted to be excused from the very power supply 
contracts that it had forced into place with reluctant wholesale power 
suppliers.438  The state’s legal argument was that wholesale power 
contracts were the exclusive province of FERC, and FERC had not 
sufficiently policed the wholesale market to ensure that it functioned 
in the public interest.439 
A majority of the Ninth Circuit affirmed this theory.440  FERC, as 
the traditional wholesale power regulator, must protect the state (and 
other stakeholders) against the state’s own regulatory actions.441  
FERC not only has exclusive authority unaffected by any state 
actions over wholesale power markets, but also has an ongoing 
obligation to continually monitor and police these markets against 
state interference.442  As referred to earlier, the Supreme Court 
confirmed that when combined with federal preemption precedent, 
 
 432. Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964). 
 433. Id. 
 434. Granite Rock Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 435. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 471 F.3d at 1058. 
 436. Id. at 1066. 
 437. See Ferrey, supra note 17, §§ 10:17.1-9 et seq. 
 438. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 471 F.3d at 1067. 
 439. Id. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. 
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energy market regulatory reforms have contributed to “a massive 
shift in regulatory jurisdiction from the states to the FERC.”443 
State law is not allowed to preempt federal determinations by 
layering on additional requirements not contained in federal law.444  
The wholesale price determination is reserved exclusively to federal 
authority.445  The filed-rate doctrine extends to non-rate matters as 
well.446  The FPA precludes all state regulation of interstate wholesale 
power transactions.447 
From any type of generating source, moving electrons constitute 
power.448  There is no engineering difference in the end product.449  It 
is clear that the state can regulate non-price aspects of the power sale 
market within state boundaries.450  There is mixed jurisprudence on 
how far a state can go.  For example, a New York decision held that a 
state cannot compel a utility to purchase power from a particular 
wholesale source,451 and it also cannot attempt to determine the price 
of a wholesale transaction, which is exclusively within FERC 
jurisdiction.  According to FERC, it “cannot ascertain . . .  any legal 
basis under which states have independent authority to prescribe 
rates for sales by QFs at wholesale [to utilities] that exceed the 
avoided cost cap contained in PURPA.”452 
 
 443. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 471 F.3d at 1064 (quoting Carmen L. Gentile, The Mobile-Sierra 
Rule: Its Illustrious Past and Uncertain Future, 21 ENERGY L.J. 353, 373 (2000)); see also Entergy 
La., Inc., v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39 (2003). 
 444. Granite Rock Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 445. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982). 
 446. The Supreme Court extends the filed-rate doctrine generally to include most aspects of 
federal-state utility regulation.  Moreover, the filed rate doctrine is not limited to “rates” per se: 
“our inquiry is not at an end because the orders do not deal in terms of prices or volumes of 
purchases.” N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 372 U.S. 84, 90–91 (1963).  
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966–67 (1986). 
 447. Nantahala Power & Light Co., 476 U.S. at 966 (noting the “exclusive jurisdiction vested 
by Congress in FERC over the regulation of wholesale utility rates”); Miss. Power & Light Co. 
v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988) (“FERC has exclusive authority to determine 
the reasonableness of wholesale rates.”); accord Miss. Indus. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1525, 1535–49 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 448. Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe:  Thermodynamics, Mass 
and Energy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1839, at 1908–1912. 
 449. See Ferrey, supra note 17, § 10:79. 
 450. See S. Cal. Edison Co., 71 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61.269 (1995) 
 451. Consol. Edison Co. v. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 472 N.E.2d 981, 982 (1984). 
 452. Conn. Light & Power Co., Docket No. EL93-55-000, 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,012, ¶ 61,029 
(1995) (order granting permission for declaratory order).  This case involved a QF selling to a 
utility.  In this opinion, FERC further articulated that if the seller was not a QF under PURPA, 
the sale would still be jurisdictional to FERC based on its exclusive authority under the Federal 
Power Act. 
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 VII. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCLUSION 
Federal case law and FERC precedent indicate that PURPA and 
the FPA prevent utilities from being mandated or required to 
purchase renewable energy above their avoided cost for wholesale 
purchases.453  Even state feed-in tariff legislation cannot mandate a 
wholesale electric purchase at a rate per kWh above the avoided cost 
under principles of federal preemption.454  Any theoretical feed-in 
tariff proposal, in order to be effective, would have to require prices 
well above purchasing utilities’ avoided costs, and therefore would be 
subject to a Federal Power Act challenge by ratepayers or utilities. 
PURPA regulations and the FERC provide that they do not limit 
the ability of parties to negotiate agreements for rates and terms 
different from those called for in the regulations.455  However, a 
situation where utilities voluntarily agree to purchase power at a rate 
clearly exceeding their wholesale avoided cost would also be open to 
legal challenge as “imprudent” under the FPA or its PURPA 
amendments by other parties, such as industry or consumer groups, if 
the latter are consequently forced to pay a higher retail rate for 
electricity.  Furthermore, it is unclear that voluntary utility 
participation, at the utility’s own cost and risk, would provide the 
long-term investment certainty desired from a feed-in tariff incentive 
program. 
The alternative would be to amend the FPA to allow states to 
require purchase of renewable energy at rates above avoided cost.  
Another option would be a federally mandated RPS or renewable 
energy requirement.  However, a federal renewable standard might 
not result in the type of long-term prices that renewable energy 
generators enjoy in Europe. 
Of particular importance, the electricity rate increases associated 
with existing state RPS policies are generally equal to one percent or 
less so far, and thus are priced competitively with fossil fuel-fired 
 
 453. See supra note 423 and accompanying text. 
 454. Some commentators have suggested that if a state challenge to PURPA went to the 
current US Supreme Court, it is possible, given the current justices, that PURPA would be ruled 
unconstitutional in favor of greater State autonomy over electric rates.  See Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 777 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting that the majority was wrongly persuaded that PURPA “does not 
intrude impermissibly into state sovereign functions”). 
 455. 18 C.F.R. § 292.301(b)(1) (2009). 
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generation.456  Thus, in most states, there is not an obvious need for 
higher feed-in tariffs. 
Nonetheless, grafting onto American constitutional law a feed-in 
tariff for renewable power, at above the typical wholesale market cost 
of all power or above a purchasing utility’s avoided cost of alternative 
equivalent power resources, violates existing precedent and 
provisions of the FPA.  This renders the European option of feed-in 
tariffs legally incapable of American adaptation.  Despite this, some 
U.S. states are ignoring these issues and moving toward promotional 
feed-in tariffs.  Such actions by states (setting wholesale prices for 
power sales) are preempted under the Federal Power Act and the 
filed-rate doctrine as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
This leaves the RPS, as now adopted by more than half the 
states, as the legally viable alternative to monetarily incentivize the 
adoption of renewable power technologies for power generation by 
independent power producers in the United States.  Renewable 
energy promotion has important implications for the control of 
carbon emissions from the power sector,457 therefore it is vital to 
reconcile national energy policy with constitutional requirements and 
send clear signals to states. 
 
 
 456. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 29.  Only in Massachusetts and Connecticut, 
with the highest RECs trading costs, has the impact on rates of RPS exceeded 1%.  Id. 
 457. See generally Ferrey, supra note 18. 
